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NOTES
Cults, Deprogrammers, and the Necessity Defense
As membership in religious "cults" 1 has increased dramatically
during the last decade,2 public concern for the welfare of cult members, who are largely young adults,3 has also risen apace. 4 As a result, many parents have taken drastic action to protect their children
from these groups. Some parents have gained temporary legal control over their children,5 but attempts to work within the legal system
I. In Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031
(1981), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: "The word 'cult' is not used pejoratively but in
its dictionary sense to describe an unorthodox system of belief characterized by '[g]reat or
excessive devotion to some person, idea, or thing.'" (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 552 (1976)).
2. Some authorities suggest that over 3000 cults operate in the United States, see, e.g.,
Clark, Cults, 242 J. A.M.A. 279 (1979); Levine, The Case for .Deprogramming Religious Cult
Members, SOCIETY, Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 34, 38, with membership estimates ranging from several hundred thousand to several million. Rudin, The Cult Phenomenon: Fad or Fact? 9
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 17, 18-19 (1980). See generally J. MAcCoLLAM, CARNIVAL
OF SOULS 174-75 (1979).
'
3. The great majority of cult members are between 18 and 25 years old. J. MAcCoLLAM,
supra note 2, at 52.
4. Critics charge that many cults recruit members deceptively, and then employ various
techniques to ensure the members' complete obedience to the leaders' will. Once this loyalty is
obtained, members adopt a rigidly proscribed lifestyle, which includes long hours devoted to
fundraising and recruiting. See Galanter, Rabkin, Rabkin & Deutsch, The "Moonies'~· A Psychological Study of Conversion and Membership in a Contemporary Religious Sect, 136 AM. J.
PSYCH. 165, 167 (1979) (members worked an average of 67 hours per week, compared to 41
hours before joining); Rudin, supra note 2, at 27 (cult followers sometimes work eighteen to
twenty hours a day, seven days a week).
For critical analyses of cults, see Delgado, Religious Tota/ism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. I (1977); LeMoult, .Deprogramming Members ofReligious Sects, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 599 (1978); Note, High .Demand Sects: .Disclosure
Legislation and the Free Exercise Clause, 15 NEW ENG. L. REv. 128 (1979); Comment, Piercing
the Religious Veil of the So-Called Cults, 1 PEPP. L. REV. 655 (1980). Cults have been more
favorably assessed in DeSocio, Protecting the Rights ofReligious Cults, 8 HUMAN RIGHTS 38
(1979); Note, Legal Issues in the Use of Guardianship Procedures lo Remove Members of Cults,
18 ARiz. L. REV. 1095 (1976); Comment, "Mind Control" or Intensity of Faith: The Constitutional Protection of Religious Beliefs, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 751 (1978); Note,
.Deprogramming Religious Cultists, 11 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 807 (1978); Note, Conservatorships
and Religious Cults, .Divining a Theory ofFree Exercise, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1247 (1978); Comment, The .Deprogramming ofReligious Sect Members: A Private Right ofAction Under Section
1985(3), 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 229 (1979); Note, People v. Religious Cults: Legal Guidelines far
Criminal Activities, Tort Liability and Parental Remedies, 11 SUFFOLK L. REv. 1025, 1048
(1977); Note, Abduction, Religious Sects and the Free Exercise Guarantee, 25 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 623 (1974). Both sides of the debate are thoroughly discussed in the articles in Colloquium
-Alternative Religions: Government Control and the First Amendment, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE I (1980).
.
For a thorough annotated bibliography of published and unpublished literature relating to
cults, see T. ROBBINS, CML LIBERTIES, "BRAINWASHING" AND "CULTS" (1979).
5. See text at notes 197-98 infra.
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have frequently failed. 6 Frustrated by the perceived inadequacy of
legal alternatives, other parents have hired "deprogrammers,"7 who
abduct children from cults and confine them for several days of
treatment. 8 Although precise figures are unavailable, some evidence
suggests that the number of deprogrammings runs into the
thousands. 9
Efforts by cult members to obtain legal protection against
deprogramming have yielded mixed results. 10 Deprogrammers prosecuted for kidnapping or false imprisonment have relied on the ne-

,

6. Criminal actions brought against cult leaders have beeq. unsuccessful. See People v.
Murphy, 98 Misc. 2d 235,413 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1977). After hearing testimony by a cult
member's mother explaining her reason for deprogramming her daughter, a grand jury voted
not to indict the participants in the deprogramming. The grand jury instructed the district
attorney's office to continue its investigation into the activities of the cult (the Hare Krishna),
which eventually led to this criminal case. The defendants, leaders of the cult, were acquitted,
Civil actions against cult leaders have also failed. See, e.g., Turner v. Unification Church,
473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978), qffd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979) (suit alleging that cult had,
among other things, conspired to hold plaintiff in peonage and involuntary servitude was dismissed for failure to state a claim). Courts have rebuffed attempts to "free" children with
habeas corpus petitions. See Helander v. Unification Church, I Fam. L. Rep. 2797 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1975).
7. For a description of deprogramming from the point of view of the most active and
controversial deprogrammer in the United States, see T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, LET OUR
CHILDREN Go! (1976).
8. Ted Patrick claims, "All deprogramming is is talk - a lot of talk. It only lasts two or
three days." Id at 77. Others have suggested that the techniques used by deprogrammers are
"'like the Gestapo.'" Abducted woman tells ofhorror of brainwashing, Cath. Reg. (Toronto),
Mar. 22, 1975, at I, col. 2, 3, reprinted in Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue 72 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue] (a collection of documents prepared by Herbert Richardson for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Toronto School
of Theology Conferences on Religious Deprogramming) (copy on file with the Michigan Law
Review). In some cases, after spending several days in "intensive deprogramming sessions in a
physically confined setting," the deprogrammed youth may be sent to a rehabilitation center
for several weeks. Kim, Religious .Deprogramming and Subjective Reality, 40 Soc. ANALYSIS
197, 204 (1979).
9. See Delgado, supra note 4, at 80 ("approximately 1,000 deprogrammings have been
attempted in the last few years"); Panel .Discussion: Regulation ofAlternative Religions by Law
or Private Actions: Can and Should we Regulate?, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109, 117
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Panel .Discussion] (statement of Jeremiah Gutman) (estimating that
thousands of people have been deprogrammed, and pointing out that Ted Patrick claims to
have participated in approximately 1600 deprogrammings).
10. Tort actions were unsuccessful in Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I.), qffd, 588
F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1980) (cult members claim that deprogrammers had conspired to deprive her of civil rights and actions based on assault and battery and
false imprisonment dismissed because of absence of evidence of compulsion); Baer v. Baer, 450
F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (motion for partial summary judgment granted against cult
member claiming deprivation of civil rights because of absence of evidence of state involvement); Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 128 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031
(1981) (false imprisonment action against parent dismissed because the child's conduct, after
several days of deprogramming, demonstrated consent to the restraint, and this consent "relates back" to her initial confinement). However, in Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70 (D.
Ariz. 1978), revd, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), the court denied in part the defendants' motion
for summary judgment in an action by a cult member alleging interference with his civil rights.
Motions to dismiss were denied in similar actions. See Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir.
1981); Cooper v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Augenti v. Cappellini, 84 F.R.D.
73 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973).
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cessity defense, 11 which has traditionally exculpated defendants who
violated a law to avoid a greater evil than the law was designed to
prevent. 12 In deprogrammine cases, the defense has proceeded in
two stages. Defendants argue first that the parents reasonably believed deprogramming necessary to protect their child from physical
and psychological harm. 13 Deprogrammers then claim that they, as
the parents' agents, should also benefit from the parents' defense because few parents could protect their children without assistance. 14
The courts have split on the legitimacy of this defense. 15
11. See generally Arnolds & Garland, The JJefense ofNecessity in Criminal Law: The Right
to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1974); Glazebrook, The Necessity Plea in English Criminal Law, 30 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 87 (1972); Hawkins, Necessity as a Statutory JJefense in Texas: A Comparison with Other States, 3 AM. J. CRIM. L. 233 (1975); Huxley,
Proposals and Counter Proposals on the JJefence of Necessity, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 141; Sullivan, The Defense ofNecessity in Texas: Legislative Invention Comes ofAge, 16 Hous. L. REV.
333 (1979); Tiffany & Anderson, Legislating the Necessity Defense in Criminal Law, 52 DEN.
LJ. 839 (1975); Williams, Necessity, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 128; Note, Necessity as a JJefense, 21
COLUM. L. REV. 71 (1921); Case Note, 13 Sw. L.J. 265 (1959).
12. See, e.g.,
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 382 (1972). The
Model Penal Code's necessity defense provides:
Section 3.02. Justification Generally: Choice of Evils.
(I) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself
or another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situations involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification does not otherwise plainly
appear.
(2) when the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a
choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification
afforded by this section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
13. See T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, supra note 7, at 270.
14. Ted Patrick, for example, relies on both official reluctance to prosecute parents for
abduction and false imprisonment and his belief that deprogr<lID.Illers may assist parents in
such activities:
From my research into the subject I was reasonably well assured that a parent would not
be prosecuted for kidnapping his own child, especially if the child was a minor. With that
in mind, I began to formulate the basis of my approach to seizing the children and
deprogramming them. The first rule was always to have at least one of the parents present
when we went to snatch somebody. The parents would have to make the first physical
contact; then, no matter who assisted them afterwards, it would be the parents who were
responsible. And !fa parent was not committing a crime by seizing his or her child, no one
else could be considered an accessory to a crime.
T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, supra note 7, at 65 (emphasis added).
15. Patrick has been acquitted twice in New York. Brown, Memorandum on Ted Patrick
and Religious Cults, in Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue, supra note 8, at 138. Patrick
was also acquitted in Washington. United States v. Patrick, 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976). Patrick was convicted of false imprisonment in Colorado, in Peop~e v. Patrick, 541 P.2d 320 (Colo.
App. 1975), and was convicted along with the cult member's parents, of misdemeanor kidnapping, in Orange County, California. See Individual Freedom Foundation Newsletter, reprinted
in Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue, supra note 8, at 134. Most recently, Patrick was
convicted in San Diego, California, of conspiracy, false imprisonment, and kidnapping. This
was the first time that Patrick was convicted of a felony. See People v. Patrick, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 30, 1980, at 7, col I (San Diego Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 1980).

w.

Michigan Law Review

274

[Vol. 80:271

This Note considers the applicability of the necessity defense in
criminal prosecutions of parents and deprogrammers. Part I explores the conflicting policies that underlie the traditional necessity
defense, and suggests that courts replace their unitary approach to
necessity with a "choice of evils" defense - for actors reasonably
attempting to avoid a greater evil - and a "compulsion" defense for actors reacting understandably to the pressure of circumstances.
Part II applies these defenses to deprogramming cases, and concludes that rarely may they be advanced successfully.
I. A

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR JUDGING NECESSITY CASES

A.

The Inadequacy of a Unitary Approach to Necessity

The necessity defense, like any other doctrine of excuse or justification, 16 should be sustained whenever its underlying policies are
furthered. 17 Identification of those policies is, therefore, a prerequi16. A defense can either justify or excuse behavior that would otherwise be criminal.
Broadly speaking, a defense justifies behavior when it recognizes "an exception to a general
rule making [certain behavior punishable] ..• because the policy or aims which in general
justify the punishment" do not apply in a specific case. . . . [W]hat is done is regarded as
something which the law does not condemn, or even welcomes." A defense excuses behavior
when "(w]hat has been done is something which is deplored, but the psychological state of the
agent when he did it exemplified one or more of a variety of conditions which are held to rule
out the public condemnation and punishment of individuals." H. HART, Prolegomenon to the
Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 13-14 (1968). The distinction has been explained as "the same as that between being forgivably wrong and being right,
or between being pardoned and being praised." Arnolds & Garland, supra note 11, at 290.
On the nature of excuse and justification generally, see H. HART, Legal Responsibility and
Excuses, in THE CONCEPT OF LAW 174-75 (1961); Eser, Just!ftcation and Excuse, 24 AM. J.
COMP. L. 621 (1976); Fletcher, The Individualization ofExcusing Conditions, 41 S. CAL, L. REV,
1269 (1974); Hall, Comment on Just!ftcation and Excuse, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 638 (1976); Robinson, A Theory ofJust!ftcation: Societal Harm as a Prerequisitefor Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA
L. REV. 266. The confusion regarding the nature of the necessity defense (and perhaps confusion regarding the difference between excuse and justification) is evident in the split among
courts and co=entators on whether the necessity defense functions as an excuse or a justification. Most courts, however, view the defense as a justification. See, e.g., United States v.
Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1978), revd., 444 U.S. 394 (1980); United States v.
Micklus, 581 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1978); State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 471, 509 P.2d 1095,
1109 (1973). A minority of courts have viewed the defense as an excuse, which mitigates rather
than eliminates criminal responsibility. See, e.g., Frasher v. State, 8 Md. App. 439, 448, 260
A.2d 656, 662, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 959 (1970), See also R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL
LAw 956 (2d ed. 1969). The better view is probably one which acknowledges that necessity
can function as either a justification or an excuse, depending on the nature of the case. See
Fletcher, supra, at 1274-77. C.f. United States v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249, 2251
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1976) ("Traditionally, the defense of necessity has been characterized as being
either a justification of or an excuse for criminal activity.").
17. For a thorough survey of the various theories behind the recognition of "excusing conditions" in the criminal law, see H. HART, supra note 16, at 28-53. Hart argues:
[E]xcusing conditions are accepted as something that may conflict with the social utility of
the law's threats • . . . Recognition of excusing conditions is seen as a matter of protection of the individual against the claims of society for the highest measure of protection
that can be obtained from a system of threats. In this way the criminal law respects the
claims of the individual as such, or at least as a choosing being, and distributes its coercive
sanctions in a way that reflects this respect for the individual.
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site to analysis of the traditional approach to the defense. Although
defendants plead necessity infrequently, 18 they have sought to apply
the defense to remarkably diverse types of conduct. 19 The variegated necessity cases, however, divide readily into three distinct fact
Id at 49 (emphasis in original). See also Fletcher, supra note 16, at 1299-309 (arguing that
American law, unlike German law, resists recognition of excuses or defenses that would require inquiry whether specific defendants in particular cases deserve punishment).
18. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 416 (2d ed. 1960) ("The explication of [the necessity doctrine] in English and American law, which has perforce dealt only
piecemeal with peripheral aspects of the general problem, is disappointing."); W. LAFAVE &
A. ScoIT, supra note 12, at 383 ("[T]he cases are not numerous . . . ."); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 731 (2d ed. 1961) ("There are few American authorities."). It has been suggested
that the paucity of cases involving the defense can be attributed to the unwillingness of law
enforcement officials to prosecute in cases involving a clear, compelling claim of necessity. See
Arnolds & Garland, supra note 11, at 291.
19. The necessity defense has been raised in cases involving cannibalism, see Regina v.
Dudley & Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (defendants were sentenced to death, but sentence
was later co=uted to six months imprisonment), and human.jettison, see United States v.
Holmes, 26 Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383) (defendant convicted of manslaughter,
but his six month sentence was later remitted). It has also justified mutinies, see, e.g., United
States v. Borden, 24 F. Cas. 1202 (D.C. Mass. 1857) (No. 14,625) (revolt was justified if the
crew had good reason to believe, and did believe, that they would be subjected to unlawful and
cruel or oppressive treatment); United States v. Nye, 27 F. Cas. 210 (C.C. Mass. 1855) (No.
15,906) (jury instructed that revolt was justified if there were reasonable grounds to believe the
ship unseaworthy), entries to embargoed ports, see, e.g., The Diana, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 354
(1868) (necessity defense rejected absent demonstration of actual necessity); Brig Struggle v.
United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 71 (1815) (necessity defense rejected absent evidence of
actual necessity); The William Gray, 29 F. Cas. 1300 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810) (No. 17,694) (defendants acquitted based on necessity defense), and killing animals to protect property, see, e.g.,
Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N.H. 398, 16 Am. Rep. 339 (1873); Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371 (Wyo.
1962).
More recently, the defense has frequently been used in cases involving prison escapes. See,
e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) (rejecting necessity and duress defenses);
Dempsey v. United States, 283 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1960) (court rejected prisoner's '1ustification" defense because he had not requested aid from prison authorities); State v. Hom, 58
Hawaii 252, 566 P.2d 1378 (1978) (necessity defense was available if certain conditions existed,
and the defense should have been submitted to the jury); People v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 362
N.E.2d 319 (1977) (reversed conviction because defense of necessity should have been submitted to jury); Iowa v. Reese, 272 N.W.2d 863 (Iowa 1978) (rejected necessity defense because
prisoner failed to return after escape); People v. Brown, 68 A.D.2d 503, 417 N.Y.S.2d 966
(1979) (justification defense rejected because prisoner did not return after escaping); State v.
Whisman, 33 Or. App. 147, 575 P.2d 1005 (1978) (choice of evils defense rejected because there
was no showing that the harm avoided was present, imminent, and impending). The appropriate method for analyzing escape cases has also received extensive discussion in law reviews.
See, e.g., Fletcher, Commentary, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a Justffecation
or an Excuse For Escape, 26 UCLA L. REv. 1355 (1979); Gardner, The .Defense of Necessity
and the Righi to Escapefrom Prison, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 110 (1975); Note, .Duress - .Defense to
Escape- Substantial threats ofhomosexual attack may support the defense ofduress in a prosecutionfar prison escape, People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N. W.2d 212 (1974), 3 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 331 (1975).
Social protesters have also made frequent use of the necessity defense. See, e.g., Note,
Necessity as a .Defense to a Charge of Criminal Trespass in an Abortion Clinic, 48 U. CIN. L.
REv. 501 (1979). Persons claiming medical necessity have advanced the defense as well. See
United States v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1976) (necessity
defense successfully asserted by defendant who claimed marijuana was necessary to treat his
glaucoma); United States v. Richardson, 588 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1978) (defense of necessity was unavailable to persons caught smuggling laetrile into the country because "there were
alternative means of obtaining the drug).
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situations, which reveal that the defense may serve several independent and potentially conflicting policies.
Each of the paradigmatic fact situations requires that an actor
choose between obeying or breaking a law under circumstances
where some harm is inevitable regardless of the actor's decision. 20 In
the first situation, an actor violates a law to avoid a greater harm
than that caused by the violation. For example, the theft of a car to
rush a dying relative to the hospital might be excusable because the
legislature would condone conduct that burdens or destroys property
to save life.21 In the second situation, an actor violates a law in a
good faith, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to avert a greater
harm. He might, for example, steal a car to rush a dying pet to a
veterinarian - a normative mistake if the legislature would let the
pet die22 - or misjudge the magnitude of the harm caused or
avoided, and destroy $3000 worth of property to save $1000 wortha factual mistake.23 In the third situation, an actor violates a law to
avoid a harm that he knows society considers less grave than the
harm caused. A husband who sacrifices two strangers to save his
wife typifies this category of actor.
In each of these situations, society may find compelling reasons
for choosing not to punish the actor. Most commonly, the necessity
defense is grounded in the utilitarian notion that society benefits if
an actor, by violating a law, avoids a greater harm. 24 Punishment in
20. The harm is inevitable in the sense that some harm will ensue regardless of the actor's
choice. In this Note, "harm avoided" refers to the harm that can be avoided or the interest
that can be protected by breaking the law; "harm caused" denotes the harm that must be
endured or the interest that must be jeopardized should the actor elect to disobey the law.
21. It is fairly well accepted that property may be appropriated or even destroyed in order
to save life or prevent injury. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1958) (mountain climber may enter dwelling during storm and appropriate provisions therein;
ship captain may jettison cargo to preserve ship and passengers).
The validity of the actor's value choice, and therefore the applicability of the defense, is
always measured with reference to what the legislature would have done if faced with a similar
situation. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 790 (1978). This is recognized in
the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra, at§ 3.02(l)(c).
22. A "normative mistake" is made when the actor believes that the type of harm avoided
by breaking the law is more severe than the type of harm caused. In some cases, the proper
choice is clear; for example, it is generally conceded that property may be appropriated or
destroyed in order to preserve life or avert injury. See note 21 supra. In other cases, however,
the proper choice is not as clear. To the extent that the necessity defense is premised on a
utilitarian rationale, see text at notes 24-26 infra, the actor's choice will be subject to a post-hoc
scrutiny that inquires whether the legislature would have made the same choice. In fact in
such situations the necessity defense "makes the judge (an} ad-hoc . . . legislature." See M.
KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO OBEY 124 (1973).
23. The mistake is factual in the sense that the actor has misestimated the degree of harm
either caused or avoided by breaking the law. This type of mistake differs from the normative
mistake in that here the actor is correct in his evaluation of the normative ''weight" to be
assigned the two harms. The actor's mistake and his failure to secure the greater good result
from the fact that his decision to break the law causes more harm or avoids less harm than the
actor had anticipated.
24. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTI, supra note 12, § 50, at 382 ("The rationale of the
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the first situation, for example, may discourage socially desirable
conduct. Although a violation by an actor in the second category
may make society worse off, society also has a utilitarian interest in
encouraging action when it reasonably appears that intervention will
prevent a greater evil. 25 Even if the actor's belief that society would
favor intervention was unreasonable, it is unclear whether punishment will in fact result in fewer normative and factual errors. 26 Utilitarian principles, however, cannot affirmatively justify exculpating
the third type of actor.
An actor's lack of criminal intent may also underlie acceptance
of the necessity defense in certain circumstances.27 Where an actor
violates a law in a successful attempt to avert what the legislature
would consider a greater harm, he is not culpable in any meaningful
sense of the word. 28 Because a number of factors - including supenecessity defense is not that a person, when faced with the pressure of circumstances of nature,
lacks the mental element which the crime in question requires. Rather, it is this reason of
public policy: the law ought to promote the achievement of higher values at the expense of
lesser values, and sometimes the greater good for society will be accomplished by violating the
literal language of the criminal law."); Fletcher, supra note 16, at 1274 ("The rightness of the
act typically turns on a comparison of the utility of acting (the value of the interest saved) with
the disutility of acting (the value of the interest sacrificed). Rightness is thus a matter of maximizing utility, or furthering the greater good.").
25. There is no reason to suspect a priori that actors will more often than not make the
wrong decision when confronting inevitable choices. At the same time, it has long been conceded that there are "such rare occurrences that it may be thought pedantic to legislate for
them expressly beforehand, and rash to do so without materials which the course of events has
not provided. Such cases are the case of necessity (two shipwrecked men on one plank) (and]
the case of a choice of evils . . . . Fiction apart, there is at present no law at all upon the
subject, but the judges will make one under the fiction of declaring it, if the occasion for doing
so should ever arise." Stephen, The Criminal Code, (1879), 7 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY,
136, 156 (1880) (footnote omitted).
A more comprehensive accounting of the cost involved in exculpating actors for their unsuccessful attempts to avoid the greater harm by breaking the law would probably take account of the possible decrease in respect for law and reduced certainty of the applicability in
-~P-ecific situations. See Powers, Structural Aspects ofthe Impact of Law on Moral .Duty Within
Utilitarianism and Social Contract Theo,Ji;-26-UCL-A-L-:-REV. 1263-(1979).
26. Because choice of evils situations arise infrequently, most individuals will not ponder
the penalties of an incorrect choice in advance. And those individuals who do face these situations are likely to experience pressures that make consideration of punishment highly unlikely.
See Greenawalt, Co,!fllcts ofLaw and Morality- Institutions ofAmelioration, 61 VA. L. REV.
177, 195 (1981):
It would certainly be a drawback if the existence of the defense encouraged actors to
violate the law without sufficient assessment of whether their actions really were necessary
to avoid greater evils. As far as private actors and ordinary circumstances are concerned,
this possibility is implausible in the extreme, because such a rarely used defense is unlikely to have a sigruficant effect on how private persons react to emergency situations.
27. See Hawkins, supra note 11, at 236, where it is suggested that in addition to its utilitarian purpose, necessity has been based on "the belief that he who acts to avoid an imminent
harm has acted commendably (with good intentions). To punish him, therefore, would bring
the law in general into disrepute." (footnote omitted).
28. The actor is not culpable because by breaking the law the greater good has been secured. See, W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 50, at 382; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 18,
§ 229, at 723 ("[W]hen a man has acted meritoriously, even a technical conviction is out of
place. . • . Needless convictions are an abuse of the machinery of the criminal law and tend
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rior information, greater intelligence, or mere luck - may determine
whether an actor does or does not avoid the greater harm, the second
type of actor is no more culpable than the first. 29 In the third situation, however, the actor cannot claim that he failed in an honest attempt to avoid what society would consider the greater harm. If
good intentions are the sole determinant of culpability, actors in the
third category are more culpable than those in the first two.
Yet the third type of actor's behavior may be "understandable''.
even though he did not intend to avoid what society considers the
greater evil. As used here, "understandable" means that the behavior is to be expected - other individuals would make the same decision under similar circumstances. 30 Some courts have suggested that
punishment is inappropriate in these situations because individuals
to adulterate its effect.") The actor should not be subject to penalty because "All laws admit
certain cases of just excuse, when they are offended in letter, and where the offender is under
necessity, either of compulsion or inconvenience." More v. Hussey, 80 Eng. Rep. 243, 246
(1609).
The question, of course, is under what circumstances are acts that would otherwise be
criminal justified because they tend to secure the "greater good." But if it can be demonstrated
that a particular act does further some higher value, it follows that punishment is inappropriate under any theory of punishment that focuses solely on the propriety of punishing the
individual:
Many of the ordinary reasons for punishment simply do not apply when actors are morally justified in engagmg in behavior that ordinarily is illegal. . . . [M]orally justified acts
are not, on balance, harmful to the legitimate interests of the members of society, and
society would not want to discourage those acts. Society has no reason to prevent such
acts by means of incapacitation, general and individual deterrence, and norm reinforcement. If the act has been performed for morally justifiable reasons, moral delinquency
could not be a basis for punishment, and commission of the act would not provide a
ground for reform of character. Nor could the majority of society desire vengeance if it
recognizes the appropriateness of the act.
Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 182.
29. In both situations the actor intends to violate the law and therefore "intends" to bring
about some harm. But in both situations the actor intends to avoid the greater harm, and
thereby secure the greater good, by violating the law. The difference, therefore, is in the outcome, and not in the actor's intent. If both actors intend to secure the greater good (or intend to
avoid the greater harm), the actor in the second situation is no more culpable than the actor in
the first. In this sense the actor in the second situation does not intend that his violation bring
about the balance of harm (harm caused exceeding harm avoided) that results from either a
normative or a factual mistake. Punishment therefore runs contrary to the notion that "our
substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious will. It postulates a
free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely
to do wrong." F. SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW xxxvi-xxxvii (1927) (Introduction, Roscoe
Pound). See also H. HART, supra note 16, at 114 ("All civilized penal systems make liability to
punishment for at any rate serious crime dependent not merely on the fact that the person to
be punished has done the outward act of a crime, but on his having done it in a certain state or
frame of mind or will.").
30. One commentator, addressing this issue in the context of the duress defense, has perceptively noted that the question is not whether an actor could make the "correct" choice, but
rather whether it is fair to expect that choice of the actor given the extreme pressure acting
upon the actor owing to the nature of the interests at stake: "I am extremely reluctant to
regard all or even most cases involving duress or coercion as cases where, given psychological
pressures, the individual could not have acted otherwise. . • • Rather we do not even expect
him lo try. We rely instead on the belief that the choice is unfairly posed." Murphy, Consent,
Coercion, and Hard Choices, 61 VA. L. REV. 79, 85-86 (1981) (emphasis added),
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are "compelled by circumstances"31 and do not act with legal free
will.32 This analysis is incorrect: The legal elements of a volitional
act are present in these cases.33 It is more accurate simply to concede
the actor's error and ask whether society should punish the behavior.
The notion that society may wish to exculpate actors rather than
hold them to standards that average individuals could not meet,
while not affirmatively supported by utilitarian principles,34 may not
contravene those principles. Punishing actors in the third category
may serve ·no practical purpose. Even the prospect of the death penalty will not necessarily deter an actor who seeks to avert death or
serious injury to himself or someone close to him in an emergency
situation. 35
Although courts cognizant of each of the policies underlying the
31. Cf. United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194, 1208 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967
{1978) (in discussing necessity, the court suggested that the test was whether there was "sufficient compulsion"); The William Gray, 29 F. Cas. 1300, 1302 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810) (No. 17,694)
("The variety of cases in which the absence of will excuses those who would otherwise be
offenders, have been mentioned in the course of the argument, and among them we find that
on which this defense proceeds, namely, an act which proceeds from compulsion and inevitable necessity.").
32. See, e.g., People v. Keating, 118 Cal. App. 3d 172, 173 Cal. Rep. 286, 289 n.l (1981);
State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565, 570 (Mo. 1971) (en bane) (Seiler, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1073 (1972) (''The affirmative defense of coercion and necessity are based upon the
same principle. 'If a person commits an act under compulsion, responsibility for the act cannot
be ascribed to him since in effect, it was not his own desire, or motivation, or will, which led to
the act.'" (footnote omitted) (citing Newman & Weitzer, .Duress, Free Will and the Criminal
Law, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 313 (1957))).
33. A criminal walking to execution is under compulsion if any man can be said to be so,
but his motions are just as much voluntary actions as ifhe was going to leave his place of
confinement and regain his liberty. He walks to his death because he prefers it to being
carried. This is choice, though it is a choice between extreme evils.
J. STEPHEN, A. HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 102 (Burt Franklin: Research
and Resource Series No. 71, 1964). See, e.g., State v. Michne, -Me.-, 427 A.2d 455 (1981).
34. Utilitarian principles do not justify exculpating such actors because t4e individual
knows that society considers the harm avoided less grave than the harm caused. Society is
worse off because the law is broken.
'
35. Hobbes recognized that even the most severe penalties would not serve to deter actors
in such situations:
(N]o law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a law
were obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, .(/I do it not, I die presently; !fI do it, I die
afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is time ofl!fe gained; nature therefore compels him
to the fact.
T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 197 (New York 1947) (1st ed. London 1651) (emphasis added). Williams takes the same position:
Observe that the reason for withholding punishment is not that the threat of punishment
has failed to operate in this particulan:ase, for that is true of every crime . . . . (W)e
generally cannot tell until after the event whether a threat of punishment will deter a
particular person. . . . It is only in certain classes of cases that we can say with reaonable
probability that the threat of punishment will not deter. When we can say tliis, utilitarian
theory demands that the threat of punishment be not employed, for it can result only in
useless suffering.
G. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 738. See also Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of
Homicide (pt. 1), 37 CoLUM. L. REV. 701, 738-39 (1937).
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necessity defense would justify or excuse36 actors in all three situations, courts accept the defense in practice in only a narrow range of
cases. Most courts rely on a single formulation of the necessity defense regardless of the facts of particular cases and the policies that
are implicated.37 To advance the defense successfully, a defendant
must establish that (1) he perceived38 the action necessary to prevent
an im.minent39 harm; 40 (2) the harm avoided outweighed the harm
that the law was designed to prevent;41 and (3) there existed no rea36. This distinction has one important effect. When conduct is justified, it establishes a
new rule of law to govern the value conflict faced by the actor: The court has decided that in
choosing between two possible courses of action, the actor has chosen the correct one. Consequently, any actor in similar circumstances in the future should make the same choice. Fletcher, supra note 16, at 1275-76. Consider, for example, a court that holds that parents are
justified in having their child deprogrammed. The court is saying that society has benefitted
and hence the conduct is justified, when the choice of evils is resolved in favor of deprogramming. This rule will govern such choices in the future. In contrast, because excuses focus on
the particular actor's mental state, they do not establish a rule of law binding future actors.
Eser, supra note 16, at 635. The fact that one actor was not blameworthy because his mental
state was such that his conduct is excused, does not mean that a later actor, in the same circumstances, will be excused if he makes the same choice. Whether the actor is excused will be
determined by focusing on his particular mental state.
It should be noted, however, that these differences are moderated to some extent by the fact
that justifications and excuses are rarely used in their "pure" form. For example, with any
justification there is going to be some consideration of the actor's mental state. If the actor
intended to co=it a harmful act, but the act turned out to be beneficial because of circumstances of which he was unaware, courts do not hold that the act is justified. See Bavero v.
State, 347 So.2d 781, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (prisoner escaping must prove that he did
so to avoid imminent danger, rather than with intent to elude lawful authority); MODEL PENAL
CODE§ 3.02, Co=ent 5 (rent. Draft No. 8, 1958); Gardner, The Defense ofNecessity and the
Right to Escape From Prison -A Step Towards Incarceration Free from Sexual Assault, 49 S.
CAL. L. REV. 110, 119-20 (1975). The same rule has also developed in self-defense cases. See,
e.g., Josey v. United States, 135 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1943). Moreover, in considering excuses,
courts do not focus exclusively on the mental state of the actor. Decisions are in part based on
certain assumptions about the way society can expect the actor to behave (this is most evident
in the use of the reasonable man standard). Courts may focus more on circumstances, and
assumed mental states, than on an individual actor's mental state.
37. q: United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1978), revd., 444 U.S. 394
(1980) (noting the "tendency of courts to structure duress/necessity defenses in terms of ••.
fixed rules").
38. The rule has been stated by Lafave and Scott as follows:
An honest (and, doubtless, reasonable) belief in the necessity of his action is all that is
required, however, so that he has the defense even if, unknown to him, the situation did
not in fact call for the drastic action taken. Thus if A kills B reasonably believing it to be
necessary to save C and D, he is not guilty of murder even though, unknown to A, C and
D could have been rescued without the necessity of killing B.
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 50, at 386. See Arnolds & Garland, supra note 11, at
294; Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 11, at 868.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Ashton, 24 Cas. 873, 874 (No. 14,470) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834);
State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 201, 183 N.W.2d 541, 544 (1971); State v. Graham, 201 Neb.
659, 662, 271 N.W.2d 456, 458 (1978); State v. Burney, 49 Or. App. 529, 619 P.2d 1336, 1339
(1980); W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 50, at 388.
40. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 50, at 386; Arnolds & Garland, supra note
II, at 294.
41. This balancing is done objectively by the court, and not by the actor himself. See W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 50, at 259.
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sonable alternatives to violating the law.42 Because courts have traditionally been wary of the defense, 43 many limit it in other ways as
well.44 Under this formulation, courts accept the defense in many
cases where the defendant successfully averted a greater harm and in
some cases where the defendant attempted to prevent a greater harm
but failed. However, most courts, over occasional dissents and despite scholarly criticism,45 reject the defense in the third fact
situation.
The rationale for this unitary approach to the necessity defense is
rarely expressed,46 but it appears to be based on a compromise between notions of utilitarianism and nonculpability that is not wholly
consistent with any of the policies underlying the defense. The com42. See, e.g., United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d I 194, 1208 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
967 (1978); State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 472, 509 P.2d 1095, 1109 (1973); People v. Dalton,
7 Ill. App. 3d 442, 287 N.E.2d 548, 550-51 (1972).
43. The reluctance to recognize the defense probably stems from a fear that the "principle
once admitted might be made the legal cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime."
Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273,288 (1884). The premise of the defense arguably
runs counter to "the proposition that, however it may be that . . . persons come by their
thoughts and motives, it is possible for them to control their conduct - at least as regards the
infliction of serious harms." J. HALL, supra note 18, at 415.
44. For example, necessity is not a defense to killing an innocent person. See, e.g., Regina
v. Dudley & Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884); R. PERKINS, supra note 16, at 957. There are no
cases in this country in which necessity has been accepted as a defense to the killing of another
person. Hawkins, supra note 11, at 239.
And the harm prevented must be caused by natural, not human, forces. See, United States
v. Micklus, 581 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1978); State v. Olsen, 99 Wis.2d 572, 299 N.W.2d 632,
634 (1980); W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 50, at 381. One writer has suggested that
this restriction precludes the application of the necessity defense to deprogramming cases:
"The 'deprogramming' situation is obviously of human origin, not created by the weather or a
natural catastrophe, and, consequently, the 'necessity' defense is incorrectly invoked in such
actions." Note, supra note 4, 11 SUFFOLK L. REV. at 1048.
In addition, the value choice made by the actor cannot be foreclosed by a deliberate legislative choice, MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02, Comment l(b) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958), or be based
on moral opposition to the statute, see generally Note, supra note 19, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. at 508.
Nor can the actor's predicament be a result of his own negligence. See Sansom v. State, 390
S.W.2d 279,280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (court rejected defendant's claim that he took control
of car, while drunk, for purpose of parking it, because the defendant's predicament was "of his
own doing"); 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE§ 171 (1957).
But see Woods v. State, 121 S.W.2d 604,605 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938) ("Nor do we believe that
one, though negligently causing a collision, who receives injuries himself which would require
treatment and medical attention, would be required to render aid to another . • • .").
45. See Fletcher, supra note 19, at 1368 (''The fact is that we need a set of three defenses
. . . [one of which would] cover the cases on nonculpable reactions to situations of danger.").
Salmond argued some time ago that the necessity rubric covered any "motive adverse to the
law, and of such exceeding strength as to overcome any fear that can be inspired by the threat
of legal penalties • . . . Where threats are necessarily ineffective,·-they should not be made,
and their fulfillment is the infliction of needless and uncompensated evil." J. SALMOND, JuRISPRUDENCE 406 (7th ed. 1924). Nevertheless, Salmond concluded that the practical and evidentiary difficulties of implementing this theoretical position justified restricting the scope of
the defense and limiting the effect of the defense to mitigation rather than excuse. Id at 407.
46. This is not surprising given that most courts look at the defense as having a singular
purpose (although their view of this purpose may vary). But see United States v. Randall, 104
Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1976) (recognizing two distinct views of necessity).
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mon stipulation that the existence of evils is judged by the subjective
perception of the actor47 and many of the limits that courts have
placed on the defense48 undercut the utilitarian ideal. The refusal to
exculpate actors who make normative mistakes49 and other requirements that effectively preclude the defense despite the actor's desire
to prevent a greater evil50 undercut the nonculpability rationale.
And the unitary approach completely ignores the idea that society
may wish to exculpate actors who respond to unusually demanding
circumstances precisely as most members of society would respond.
The inability of the unitary approach to encompass all of the diverse situations in which the policies underlying the necessity defense support withholding punishment justifies the recognition of
two distinct defenses. 51 The first, which this Note will refer to as the
"choice of evils" defense, would exculpate actors whose conduct reasonably appeared necessary to prevent a greater evil. The second,
which the Note will term the "compulsion" defense, 52 would exculpate actors whose conduct resulted from unusually demanding circumstances that would cause a person of reasonable firmness to
respond similarly. s3

B. The "Choice of Evils" Defense
Before accepting a choice of evils defense, courts should require
defendants to demonstrate54 an honest and reasonable belief that
(1) their conduct was necessary to prevent a harm from occurring;
(2) the harm likely to be avoided clearly outweighed the harm likely
to be caused; and (3) there existed no reasonable alternative to violating the law. The availability of this reformulated defense would
tum primarily on the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in necessity, but the defense is not without limits.
47. One court has been troubled by this inconsistency. In United States v. Mowat, 582
F.2d 1194 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978), the court questioned the requirement
that the facts be judged subjectively, suggesting that this approach was arguably inconsistent
with the defense's purpose of insuring that the greater evil be avoided. 582 F.2d at 1208, n.14.
48. See note 44 supra and notes 62-78 infra.
49. See note 22 supra and notes 62-66 infra.
SO. See note 44 supra and notes 67-82 infra.
51. A growing number of commentators are recognizing that courts should abandon the
unitary approach to necessity. See Huxley, supra note 11, at 144; Comment, 67 CALIF. L. Rev.
1183, 1200 (1979); Note, Just!ftcation: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on Statuto,y Reform, 15 CoLUM. L. Rev. 914, 921 (1975). The German Penal Code has recognized a dual
notion of necessity. Section 35 STGB, quoted in Eser, supra note 16, at 636-37 n.81; § 34
STGB, quoted in-Eser,..szpm_note 16, at 634 n.65.
52. Although the Note uses the term "compulsion," the defense does not incorporate any
belief that the defendant did not act of his own free will.
53. In many ways the proposed compulsion defense resembles a liberalized duress defense.
See notes 98-115 infra and accompanying text.
54. The burden of proof in necessity cases has been placed on the defendant. See, e.g.,
United States v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249, 2254 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1976).
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The requirement that defendants demonstrate a reasonable belief
that the harm likely to be avoided outweighed the harm likely to be
caused comports with the traditional fiction that an individual facing
an inevitable choice acts as an agent of the legislature.55 A purely
subjective belief that the harm avoided outweighed the harm caused
would not justify application of the choice of evils defense. For example, the defense would not avail an actor who destroyed draft
records to avoid the harms associated with a war that he believed
immoral. This limitation, which is common to both the unitary approach and this Note's proposal, is based on the belief that courts
should confine the necessity defense to circumstances that, if considered, would have been exempted from the law. 56 If the legislature
has explicitly decided the value choice that confronts an actor, he
cannot claim that he violated the statute to avert a greater evil. 57
The proposed defense's further requirement that the harms to be
avoided reasonably appear clearly to outweigh the harms caused
comports with the notion that we live in a society of laws, and checks
individual discretion to modify those laws. One could argue, as have
the drafters of the Model Penal Code,58 that actors should violate
laws whenever it reasonably appears that the costs of obedience marginally outweigh the costs of violation. But such a standard would
undermine citizens' respect for the law,59 and courts should weigh
55. The tacit assumption, of course, is that the legislature would approve actions that bring
about the "greater good," even if this requires violating the literal letter of the law. See M.
KADISH & s. KADISH, supra note 22, at 124:
Instead of including the defense by specifying the particular circumstances in which the
defense exists, the law may delegate authority to the courts to find a defense made out in
terms of some broadly stated policy or principle. The legislature has gone as far as it can
(or will) in defining the special circumstances of nonliability appropriate to the ends of its
legislation. The task of defining others it remits to the courts on an ad hoc 'basis as the
cases arise. It is in this sense that the lesser-evil defense may be said to be included in the
law. The law includes the requirement that the courts assess whether breaching the rule
was preferable to complying with it in the circumstances.
56. See, e.g., State v. Goff, 79 S.D. 138, 141-42, 109 N.W.2d 256, 257-58 (1961) (court
inferred that legislature must have intended exception in statute).
57. Perhaps the foremost justification for this limitation is that it is preferable to have
decisions made through democratic processes than by private individuals. It is only when the
democratic system has failed to consider the precise issue that we should encourage private
decision-making. And the risk of undermining respect for the law is particularly great where
we allow individuals to override an explicit declaration of the legislature.
58. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1964). Thus, under the Model
Penal Code, one is justified in taking one life if more than one life is thereby saved. For such
purposes the Code commands that all lives are to be considered of equal worth. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.02, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
59. The risks of encouraging citizens to violate the law when it is "justified" were discussed
in Nation v. District of Columbia, 34 App. D.C. 453 (1910). In Nation, the court affirmed a
conviction of Carry Nation for smashing bottles of liquor that she alleged were being sold
unlawfully. The court held that even if the sale was a nuisance and was illegal, private persons
should not take the matter into their own hands: "Mob law can have no recognition in our
system and should be sternly repressed in its beginning." 34 App. D.C. at 455.
Similar concerns with citizens taking the law into their own hands have been expressed in
civil disobedience cases. In United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
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this diminution of respect in the utilitarian balancing of evils.60 Exceptions to established laws are appropriate only where the "clearly
outweighs" standard is satisfied. 61 This pragmatic limitation on the
proposed defense thus balances society's short-run interest in encouraging violations of the law when necessary to prevent a greater
harm and society's long-run interest that actors not lightly violate its
laws.
The "clearly outweighs" standard serves another function as
well: Courts can use this limitation to replace the traditional approach to normative mistakes. 62 Currently, an actor may qualify for
the necessity defense notwithstanding a reasonable factual mistake, 63
nied, 391 U.S. 910 (1970), the court affirmed the defendants' convictions for destroying records
of the selective service organization. The court rejected the defendants' claim that their moral
beliefs justified such action: "No legal system could long survive if it gave every individual the
option of disregarding with impunity any law which by his personal standard was judged
morally untenable. Toleration of such conduct would not be democratic, as appellants claim,
but inevitably anarchic." 417 F.2d at 1009. The court in United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386
(7th Cir. 1971), rejected the same claim, arguing that "[a) simple rule, reiterated by a peaceloving scholar, amply refutes appellants' arrogant theory of defense: 'No man or group is above
the law.'" 454 F.2d at 392 (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 385
(1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)). See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d
515 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968). The necessity defense is rejected in these cases,
because the actor is substituting his moral judgment for a moral judgment that has already
been made by the legislature (in this case, that the Vietnam war and the draft were justified).
The necessity defense has traditionally been applied in situations where the court believes the
choice of evils facing the actor was not considered by the legislature, and had it been, the
legislature would have created an exception to the law. See Note, supra note 19, 48 U. CIN. L.
REV. at 514 (legislature has already made value judgment on abortion).
60. Fletcher, supra note 16, at 1285-86, has discussed two distinct ways in which judges can
balance the harms in necessity cases. First, they can balance the immediate costs and benefits
that were apparent to the defendant at the time of his act. Second, they can consider the social
consequences of acquitting the defendant for his act. For example, in prison cases this might
include a consideration of the effect on prison discipline if the courts began to accept the
necessity defense in these cases frequently. If the necessity defense is to be justified by utilitarian reasons, as in the case of justification necessity, courts should consider all the consequences of a decision to acquit. See People v. Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 778, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 597, 604 (1969).
61. G. GORDON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 418 (2d ed. 1978), has stressed that
the commission of a crime, in and of itself, has a negative value, and this should be considered
in deciding the applicability of the necessity defense. He suggests that this requires that the
harm avoided by the actor must be greater than the harm caused (to offset this negative value).
However, he also points out that the view that " 'necessity should be limited to cases where the
impending harm is out of all proportion to the harm done by the defendant may . . • set too
high a standard .. .'." Id at 419 n.7 (quoting Law Commission Working Paper No. 55).
This has, in fact, been the approach most courts have taken. Arnolds & Garland, supra
note 11, at 294, have noted that "[i]n most necessity cases, the question of which evil is the
lesser is really not in dispute" (i.e., it is not at issue unless the harm avoided was clearly
greater). One court has specifically stated that necessity requires that the harm resulting from
compliance with the law must have "significantly exceeded" the harm resulting from breach of
the law. State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 472, 509 P.2d 1093, 1109 (1973).
62. See note 22 supra.
63. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr,supra note 12, at 386; Arnolds & Garland,supra note 11,
at 295; Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 11, at 868.
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but most courts reject the defense if the actor made a normative mistake and balanced the competing harms incorrectly. 64 Actors thus
run the risk that a court, sitting as "an ad hoc legislature,"65 will
decide against them despite an honest and reasonable attempt to
avoid what society would consider the graver harm. 66 The proposed
defense renders this limitation unnecessary. Because the defense requires a reasonable belief that the harm likely to be avoided clearly
outweighs the harm likely to be caused, actors will obey the law in
marginal cases characterized by substantial uncertainty.
The choice of evils defense would also permit the elimination of
other limitations on the traditional approach. Although the proposed defense retai.J?.s the requirement that there be no reasonable
alternative to breaking the law, 67 the "imminence" requirement68
would be largely eliminated. Many courts, interpreting imminence
as a temporal requirement, have limited the necessity defense to
cases where the harm was about to occur. 69 This approach is
grounded primarily in the notion that unless the harm is temporally
imminent an unforeseeable event may prevent its occurrence or a
reasonable alternative to violating the law may become available. 70
64. Thus it has been said:
[A]lthough the defense of necessity is subjective as to facts, it is objective as to values. The
selection of values cannot be left to the citizen. . . . [I]t is for the judge to decide
whether, on the facts as they appeared to the defendant, a case of necessity in law was
made out, and this in tum involves deciding whether, on a social view, the value assisted
was greater than the value defeated.
G. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, § 239, at 746.
65. ALI, MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL 209 (1958), cited in M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra
note 22, at 124 n.85.
66. This concept of reasonableness must include an evaluation based on the weight that
society would give to the competing interests, rather than the individual's personal preferences.
Although an individual may consider the "value" of his wife's life to be many times greater
than that of any other life, society does not benefit by encouraging action based on this value
judgment (although society may tolerate and excuse such a choice). This does not mean that
the reasonable man will always balance evils correctly; it only means that the reasonable man
will value them from society's perspective. There may be value choices on which reasonable
minds could differ (although society has a particular preference), or situations of imminence
that prevent a reasonable person from correctly balancing evils. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note
18, § 73, at 209. In these circumstances, the actor's choice may be reasonable, albeit incorrect.
67. See text at notes 53-54 supra. From a utilitarian perspective the key issue is what is.the
most socially useful means available to avoid the injury. This allows courts to greatly favor
legal means, as they would probably avoid the harmful consequences of the illegal action (e.g.,
disrespect for the law). It would not, however, require courts to force defendants to choose any
legal alternatives regardless of the likelihood that the alternative is a reasonable substitute for
the chosen action.
68. See note 39 supra.
69. See, e.g., Smith v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565,568 (Mo. 1971), cert. deniea;·405 U.S. 1073
(1972); State v. Graham, 201 Neb. 659, 662, 271 N.W.2d 456, 458 (1978).
70. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 12, § 50(5). It has also been argued that the
imminence requirement ensures that individuals will ~terpose their judgment against the legislature's "only in cases of inescapable emergency." Fletcher, supra note 19, at 1366-67. And
one writer has claimed that although imminence is not a theoretically essential limit on the
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But a temporal imminence requirement is overly restrictive:71 Utilitarian principles justify prevention of a harm that appears reasonably likely to occur, regardless of its jmmioence. Courts should thus
refuse to accord talismanic significance to a finding that the harm
was not imminent; instead, they should regard imminence as one
factor bearing on the reasonableness of an actor's perception that the
harm likely to be avoided clearly outweighed the harm likely to be
caused. 72
Restrictions on the source and nature of the harm avoided would
also be lifted under this Note's approach. Some courts assume that
natural harms are more truly unavoidable than harms threatened by
human agents, 73 and allow the necessity defense only if the harm
avoided arose from a natural source.74 This distinction may be
sound, but courts can more rationally incorporate it into the choice
of evils defense by treating it as another factor relating to the reasonableness of the actor's perception of the need to violate the law. 75
Other jurisdictions restrict the defense to cases where an actor sought
to prevent a particular type of harm (ie., serious bodily injury).76
According to the drafters of the Model Penal Code, however, the
principle that society benefits from avoidance of greater harm is one
of general validity.77 If the defendant reasonably believed that the
harm to be avoided clearly outweighed the harm likely to be caused
defense, it can be tolerated as "simply an a priori balance of pertinent factors, a balance to
which each citizen is bound." Robinson, supra note 16, at 280 n.53.
71. The unwarranted restrictiveness of the imminence requirement has been criticized by
legal scholars. See, e.g., Tiffany & Anderson,supra note 11, at 845-46; Note, supra note 51, at
926-27. There has been a "trend ... to relax traditional notions of immediacy." Brief for
Respondent at 44, United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
72. Imminence is relevant to probability, insofar as harms about to occur are, generally,
more likely to occur than those in the future. Imminence might also be defended as relevant
because of the possibility that actors faced with an immediate harm are more likely to react
emotionally (i.e., because of the pressure of having to make a quick decision), than actors
facing an equally serious and probable harm in the future.
73. See Gardner, supra note 19, at 132.

14. See note 44supra.
75. The categorical application of the nature/human source distinction has been receiving
increasing criticism. See Iowa v. Reese, 272 N.W.2d 863,866 (Iowa 1978); Glazebrook,supra
note 11, at 88-89. Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 11, at 857, indicate that codifications of
necessity "virtually universal[ly]" reject this distinction.

16. See Wis. STAT. § 939.47 (1977) (limiting the necessity defense to situations involving
the prevention of "public disaster, or imminent death, or great bodily harm").
77. There are no restrictions on the type of harm that can be imposed or the source of the
harm that can be prevented. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
Comment 3 to § 3.02 states:
We see no reason why the scope of the defense ought to be limited to cases where the evil
sought to be avoided is death or bodily injury or any other specified harm; nor do we see a
reason for excluding cases where the actor's conduct portends a particular evil, such as
homicide.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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and has satisfied the other requirements of the defense, he should be
acquitted, regardless of the type of harm avoided.
A third restriction on the type of harm avoided is also inconsistent with the policies underlying the proposed defense. Many courts
have rejected the necessity defense where the situation that faced the
actor resulted from his own negligence.78 The rationale for these
holdings is unclear.79 Society may have an interest in punishing the
original negligent conduct, but encouraging actors to take reasonable
steps to prevent the greater evil once a dilemma has arisen furthers
the utilitarian goal of the necessity defense. Where actors would be
liable in tort for the greater harm caused by their negligence, this
restriction may not deter socially desirable conduct. 80 But eliminating the requirement would benefit society where an actor's negligence is the "cause in fact" of a greater harm, but not the "proximate
cause" necessary to establish tort liability. 81 Therefore, if a previously negligent actor chooses properly between two evils, the severity
of the punishment that he receives should not exceed that warranted
for his initial negligence. 82
Courts adopting this Note's approach to necessity would also refuse to impose categorical restrictions on the types of harm that actors can cause to prevent a greater evil. Some courts, for example,
hold that the necessity defense is never available in cases involving
the taking of innocent lives. 83 Society may have an interest in countering the belief that killing is an appropriate solution to problems, 84
but most commentators reject this position. 85 From society's perspective, killing some people to save a greater number may be preferable when an actor confronts a situation in which some people
must inevitably die.86
78. See note 44 supra.
79. See Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 11, at 865.
80. Actors who would be liable for their negligence may well decide to risk criminal liability for causing the lesser harm necessary to avoid the consequences of their negligence.
81. For a comparison of various statutory formulations that differ in their treatment of the
effect of an actor's prior fault and an evaluation of the desirability of such approaches, see
Note, Justification: The Impact of The Model Penal Code on Statutory Reform, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 914, 928 (1975).
82. See Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 11, at 865-66; MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, Comment le (fent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
83. See note 44 supra. This categorical restriction proceeds from the Kantian propositiqn
that human life can never properly be used merely as a'llleans to an end. See I. KANT, Metaphysical Foundation ofMorals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 178 (C. Friedrich ed. 1949) ("Act
so as to treat man, in your own person as well as in that of anyone else, always as an end, never
merely as a means."). Blackstone believed that a man "ought rather to die himself, than escape by the murder of an innocent." 4
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 29 (1854) (1st ed.
Oxford 1765).
84. See, e.g., R. PERKINS, supra note 16, at 960.
85. Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 11, at 860.
86. This conclusion follows readily from utilitarian principles, given the assumption that
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Where an actor violates a law in either a successful or an unsuccessful attempt to avoid a greater harm than that caused by the violation, the proposed choice of evils defense produces more desirable
results than the unitary approach. By considering primarily the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in necessity, the revised defense
better advances the utilitarian and nonculpability policies that underlie the necessity defense in such situations. And the proposal's
"clearly outweighs" standard should also mollify courts that consider a choice of evils defense limitless. At the same time, this pragmatic limitation and the other restrictions built into the suggested
defense render unnecessary the unsound categorical limits that
courts have imposed under the traditional formulation of the necessity defense.
C. The "Compulsion" .Defense
To qualify for the proposed compulsion defense, a defendant
must establish that (1) he harbored an honest and reasonable belief
that there existed a risk of death or serious injury to himself or to
someone close to him; and (2) under the circumstances, individuals
of.ordinary firmness and respect for the law would have violated the
law to avoid the threatened injury. 87 The compulsion defense attempts to address in a principled manner those cases in which an
actor violates a law to avoid a harm that he knows society considers
less grave than the harm caused. The defense thus responds to an
apparent paradox: In some situations most, if not all, members of
all lives are of equal value. The Model Penal Code prescribes that all lives should be considered equally valuable. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958),
87. The defense should be denied to an actor who intentionally or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was reasonably foreseeable "that he would be subjected to a
degree of coercion equal to or greater than that actually exerted, and that he would be required
to commit an offense at least as serious as the one actually committed." Note, The Proposed
Penal Law of New York, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1507 (1964).
This stipulation is primarily designed to prevent leaders of criminal organizations from
immunizing their underlings via threats. This concern was expressed in United States v. Vigo!,
28 F. Cas. 376 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795), where the court warned that "it would be in the power of
every crafty leader of tumults and rebellion, to indemnify his followers by uttering previous
menaces." 28 F. Cas. at 376-77. To check this possibility, New York's Penal Code provides
that the "defense of duress as defined in . . . this section is not available when a person inten•
tionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress." N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 40.00 (2) (McKinney 1975).
This approach has been criticized because it precludes the defense for an actor who might
have anticipated some small degree of coercion, but could not have anticipated the greater
degree of coercion actually exerted. Note, supra, at 1507. To require, however, that the actor
must anticipate that this greater degree of coercion would probably be exerted goes too far.
For example, there are few, if any, situations in which an actor would anticipate that he would
probably be threatened with death; even in the Mafia such a perception is questionable.
Hence, confining the limitation to cases of probable duress would defeat the policy that justifies imposition of this limitation. The approach suggested here is a compromise position, reflecting the legitimate concern expressed in the Columbia Note, but at the same time providing
a more meaningful limitation on the defense.

Note -

December 1981)

Necessity Defense

289

society will break laws that they generally support to avert a lesser
evil. 88
The principle underlying the proposed defense - that society
should not punish actors who behave as other persons would behave
under the pressure of similar circumstances89 - is neither unlimited
nor novel. One could argue that all human behavior is compelled by
circumstances - either genetic or environmental - over which the
individual has no control.90 Our legal system rejects this argument,
and instead presumes that individuals can withstand the pressure of
circumstances and conform their behavior to the law's requirements.91 Where this capacity is utterly lacking, punishment is not
imposed. Thus, insane individuals are exculpated, and the defense
of involuntariness exculpates actors who serve as the unwilling or
unwitting agents of others.92
But the line that the legal system draws between these actors and
individuals who retain the ability to choose between obeying and
breaking the law is not unwavering. The law also recognizes that
external pressures may reduce an actor's criminal responsibility even
though he did not wholly lack capacity and was capable of obeying
the law. For example, provocation may reduce what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter.93 This defense does not completely
exculpate defendants because the law assumes that, although the
provocation would affect reasonable individuals and reduce their
criminal responsibility, it would not affect them to such a degree that
killing is an excusable response. 94 The duress defense also recog88. See G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 579 (1978) ("Surely the jury are not
to be asked whether it was moral for the defendant to give way to the threat. . . . He is
acquitted not because he has chosen a lesser evil but because it is unlikely that the law's threats
can serve a useful purpose in the circumstances.") (emphasis in original).
89. See note 30 supra.
90. See, e.g., B. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 6-7, 115-16 (1953); Bleechmore, The Denial of Responsibility as a General Defense, 23 ALA. L. REV. 237 (1971).
91. See. e.g., United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting) ("It is a basic precept in Anglo-American law that the exercise of 'free' will is
essential to criminal responsibility."), revd, 444 U.S. 394 (1980); D.P.P. v. Lynch, (1975) A.C.
653, 689 (Lord Simon) ("[T)he law also accepts generally as an axiom the concept of the free
human will - that is, a potentiality in the conscious mind to direct conscious action - specifically, the power of choice in regard to action."). Moreover, the law "assumes that free will
exists equally in all persons and to an extent sufficient to conform to the normative prescriptions established by society." M. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 158 (1978).
92. For illustrations of cases in which convictions were reversed because the defendant did
not act voluntarily, see Brinig, The Mistake of Fact Defense and the Reasonableness Requirement, GEO. MAsoN
L. REV. 209, 211 n.5 (1978).
93. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 76, at 573.
94. Arguably duress only reduces, but does not eliminate, the responsibility of the actor. If
this view were accepted, duress, like provocation, might be treated as a ground for mitigation,
but not exculpation of the crime. New Jersey has taken a middle approach, providing that
duress mitigates murder to manslaughter, but exculpates all other crimes. State v. Toscano, 74
NJ. 421, 440 n.12, 378 A.2d 755, 764 n.12 (1977). This approach could be justified by the
assumption that while the actor's capacity is sufficiently diminished to deny responsibility for
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nizes the effects of external pressures, 95 and that, in some situations,
human threats may so overwhelm an actor's ability to resist that he
should be exculpated for his subsequent conduct. 96 Courts allow the
duress defense not because actors facing illegal threats lack free will,
but rather because the pressure on actors to make an "unreasonable"
choice is so great that their violations are "understandable."97
The proposed compulsion defense shares much in common with
the traditional formulation of the duress defense. The duress
defense exculpates defendants who violate the law in a manner demanded98 by another individual,99 in response to a specific
most acts, it is not so diminished that the actor does not have the capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of killing a human being.
95. See People v. Terry, 30 Ill. App. 3d 713, 715, 332 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1975); People v.
Rodriguez, 30 Ill. App. 3d 118, 120 (1975).
96. Many scholars have taken the view that the basis for the defense is that the individual's
will was overcome. See, e.g., Fletcher, "Sllpra note 16, at 1288; and Newman & Weitzer, supra
note 32, at 123-24. Newman and Weitzer suggest:
If a person commits an act under compulsion, responsibility for the act cannot be ascribed
to him since, in effect, it was not his own desire or motivation, or will, which led to the act.
Punishment of the actor would be misdirected and futile since it would deter neither him
nor others, if all were equally compelled to do acts outside of their own control. Thus, the
law has reasoned that where it can be shown that a man acted under a compulsion which
deprived him of his free will, he should not be held responsible for his act. This, in
essence, is the thinking that lies behind the formulation of the duress doctrine.
Id at 123-24. Similar terminology has been used by many courts. See, e.g., United States v.
Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1978), revd, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) ("negates the intent or
voluntariness elements of an offense"); Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492, 494 (D.C. Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 915 (1967) ("an act committed under compulsion •.. is involuntary"); People v. Graham, 57 Cal. App. 3d 238,240, 129 Cal. Rptr. 31, 32 (1976) ("had only to
raise a reasonable doubt he had acted in the exercise of his free will"); People v. Wester, 237
Cal. App. 2d 232, 234, 46 Cal. Rptr. 699, 703 (1965) ("escaping against his will"); People v.
Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 622, 232 N.W.2d 184, 187 (1975) ("duress overcomes the defendant's
free will"); State v. Savoie, 67 N.J. 439, 455, 341 A.2d 598, 607 (1975) (duress as incapacity to
act voluntarily); State v. Gann, 244 N.W.2d 746, 752 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1976) ("remove the free
will of the actor"); State v. Pearson, 15 Utah 2d 353, 354, 393 P.2d 390, 391 (1964) (rejecting
duress because the "escape was the result of a voluntary decision").
This position has also been taken by the English and Irish courts. E.g., Regina v. Kray
(Ronald), 53 Crim. App. 569, 578 (1969) ("ceased to be an independent actor"); Regina v.
Hudson (1971] 2 Q.B. 202 (''will of the accused was overborne"); Attorney-General v. Whelan,
[1934) I.R. 518,526 ("overbear the ordinary power of human resistance").
97. Regardless of the pressures on an actor, the actor is still capable of choosing to comply
with the law. G. GORDON, supra note 61, at 417. If society withholds punishment, it is not
because the actor was unable to choose to act within the law; rather, it is because society
recognizes the pressures on the individual and considers the imposition of punishment on an
individual responding to these pressures to be unjust. In actuality, this is similar to the view
that the actor lacked free will, because it is a recognition that the actor only violated the law
because of the presence of external pressures. The proper inquiry for courts is into the sufficiency of these pressures and the understandability of the actor's response, rather than the
actor's capacity for compliance with the law. See generally Newman & Weitzer, supra note 32,
at 137 (suggesting that the "law must give up its present formulation of the duress doctrine. It
must put aside the issues of free will altogether, profiting from its experiences with the concept
and from the failure of this concept to serve desired purposes").
98. The existence of a coercer is a necessary implication of the requirement that the conduct be demanded.
99. See United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1977); Rhode Island Rec.
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threat 100 of imminent 101 bodily injury 102 to the defendant or a c,ose
relative. 103 The threat must be one that a person of ordinary firmCenter, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1949); State v. Hom, 58
Hawaii 252, 566 P.2d 1378 (1977); People v. Robinson, 41 Ill. App. 3d 526, 529, 354 N.E.2d
117, 120 (1976); People v. Coogler, 35 Ill. App. 3d 176, 178, 340 N.E.2d 623, 624 (1975); State
v. Jones, 2 Kan. App. 2d 220, 224, 577 P.2d 357, 360 (1978); State v. Disscini, 126 N.J. Super.
565,569, 316 A.2d 12, 15 (App. Div. 1974), qffd., 66 N.J. 411, 331 A.2d 618 (1975) (per curiam);
State v. Procter, 51 Ohio App. 2d 151, 158-59, 367 N.E.2d 908, 913-14 (1977). However, the
Rhode Island Rec. Center court noted:
[P]erhaps the law of coercion developed in a tough-minded age, and now-a-days its severity should be relaxed. Although we are not aware of any supporting authority, maybe we
ought to hold that under the circumstances it could be found that the vague menace of
future injury of some unspecified sort was enough to induce in Edward a well founded
present fear of future death or serious physical harm.
177 F.2d at 605.
100. See United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 825 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970
(1977); Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935); People v. Lo Cicero, 71
Cal. 2d 1186, 1190, 80 Cal. Rptr. 913,916,459 P.2d 241, 244 (1969); People v. Robinson, 41 Ill.
App. 3d 526, 527, 354 N.E.2d 117, 120 (1976); People v. Moon, 38 Ill. App. 3d 854, 350 N.E.2d
179, 186-87 (1976); State v. Milum, 213 Kan. 581,582,516 P.2d 984,985 (1973); State v. Perry,
565 S.W.2d 841, 843-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Brown, 561 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978); State v. Palmieri, 93 N.J.L. 195, 200, 107 A. 408, 409 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919);
Esquibel v. State, 91 N.M. 498,500,576 P.2d 1129, 1131 (1978); Burton v. State, 51 Tex. Crim.
196, 201, 101 S.W. 226, 229 (1907). Contra, People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 486, 220
N.W.2d 212, 214 (1974), q/fd., 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975) (suggesting that in determining imminence, court should consider "all the surrounding circumstances, including the
defendant's opportunity and ability to avoid the feared harm").
IOI. See Johnson v. State, 379 A.2d 1129 (Del. 1977); Bavero v. State, 347 So. 2d 781 (Fla.
App. 1977); Hill v. State, 135 Ga. App. 766, 219 S.E.2d 18 (1975); People v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d
333, 362 N.E.2d 310 (1977); People v. Hocquard, 64 Mich. App. 331, 236 N.W.2d 72 (1975);
Esquibel v. State, 91 N.M. 498, 576 P.2d 1129 (1978); State v. Crews, 17 N.C. App. 141, 193
S.E.2d 317, 318 (1972); State v. Procter, 51 Ohio App. 2d 141, 378 N.E.2d 908 (1977).
102. It is not at all clear what parties, if any, can be threatened other than the actor. It has
been suggested that "the determination . . • depends upon such factors as the relationship
between accused and the person threatened or injured, the communication of such threats or
injury to accused, etc. The few cases in point exhibit varying results in view of the individual
facts and circumstances shown." Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d at 917 (1955). Commentators think that
~the defense is not limited to threats directed at the defendants. See Hersey & Avins, Compulsion as a .Defense to Criminal Prosecutions, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 283, 286 (1958).
Although the cases on point are sparse, this view is supported by the case law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gamer, 529 F.2d 962 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976) (duress
defense applied even though threat was to defendant's daughter); United States v. Gordon, 526
F.2d 406, 408 n.l (9th Cir. 1975) (dictum) (threats to family ''would probably suffice" but
threats to persons not related to the defendant would suffice only in "strong, dramatic and
convincing" cases); United States v. Stevison, 471 F.2d 143 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950
(1973) (coercion defense rejected, but not on ground that threat was to daughter); Rhode Island Rec. Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 606-07 (1st Cir. 1949) (Magruder, J., concurring) (suggesting that coercion might be used in circumstances where there was
threat to another, particularly to a close relative); State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 437, 378 A.2d
755, 763 (1977) (dictum) (suggesting that threats to "another person, such as a spouse or child,
whose safety means more to the threatened person than his own well being" might be sufficient). In several cases, courts have explicitly rejected such claims, but these decisions were
based on the specific language of an applicable state statute. See Peopl_e v. Jones, 105 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 164 Cal. Rptr. 124, 134-35 (1980).
103. See, e.g., Nall v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 700,271 S.W. 1059 (1925); Commonwealth
v. Reffitt, 149 Ky. 300, 148 S.W. 48 (1912); State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755 (1977).
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ness would be unable to resist, 104 and cannot arise from the defendant's own negligence. 105 If the defendant ignored a reasonable
opportunity to avoid the illegal conduct without undue risk of death
or injury, the duress defense is unavailable. 106 The duress defense is
also inapplicable in murder prosecutions, 107 and may be available
only if the crime committed is a lesser evil than the threatened
harm. 108 These similarities are not surprising: Many commentators
view duress as a subset of necessity, 109 and courts often confound the
two defenses. 110
The narrowness of the duress defense, however, prevents defendants from relying on it in many situations where the theories underlying the necessity defense suggest that punishment may be
inappropriate. Because duress is limited to cases involving human
threats, it does not avail actors who were "compelled by the circumstances."111 The compulsion defense proposed here recognizes that
104. See People v. Rodriguez, 30 Ill. App. 3d I 18, 332 N.E.2d 194 (1975); State v. Patterson, I 17 Or. 153, 241 P. 977 (1925).
105. See United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 543 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 91 I
(1978); United States v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975); Shannon v. United States, 76
F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935); Rhode Island Rec. Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d
603 (1st Cir. 1949); People v. Tallent, 89 Cal. App. 2d 158, 200 P.2d 214 (1948); People v.
Villega!, 29 Cal. App. 2d 658, 85 P.2d 480 (1938).
106. See Hersey & Avins, supra note 102, at 284.
107. See, e.g., R. PERKINS, supra note 16, at 95.
108. This approach to analyzing duress situations was advocated by Hersey & Avins, supra
note 102, at 291. Judge Wilkey, in his dissent in United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), took this attitude toward duress, explaining:
[T]he rationale for the defense is not that the defendant, faced with the unnerving threat
of harm unless he does an act which violates the literal language of the criminal law,
somehow loses his mental capacity to commit the crime in question. Rather, it is that,
although a defendant has the mental stale which the crime requires, his conduct which violates the literal language of the criminal law is excused or justified because he has thereby
avoided a harm ofgreater magnitude.
585 F.2d at I lII (emphasis in original).
109. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scarr, supra note 12, § 50, at 383:
The defense of necessity is, of course, clearly related to that of duress (or coercion), where
the pressure on the defendant's will comes from human beings rather than from physical
circumstances. It is generally regarded as a separate defense, but it would doubtless be
possible to treat it as a branch of the law of necessity.
See also Fletcher, supra note 16, at 1288-89.
I IO. See United States v Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, I I I I (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey, J., dissent•
ing) ("Whether or not [the necessity and duress defenses] are actually distinct, they have been
hopelessly commingled in case law.") (footnote omitted), revd, 444 U.S. 394 (1980); Common•
wealth v. Thurber, - Mass.-, 418 N.E.2d 1253, 1256 (1981).
II I. Actors confronting circumstances arising from nature have to rely on the necessity
defense. However, because necessity is limited to situations where actors make a reasonable
choice, it is not a satisfactory defense for actors who concede the unreasonableness of their
choice, but assert that the choice was understandable given the external pressures. The absence of an adequate defense for such actors is unjustified. Just as the law recognizes in duress
cases that external pressures from human sources can excuse unreasonable decisions, it should
recognize the effects of these pressures when their origin is in nature. There is no a priori
reason to believe that human threats are more compelling; to the contrary, if the rationale for
limiting necessity to cases of natural origin is to be believed - i.e., human dangers are more
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it is the nature of the interest threatened, and not the source or specificity112 of the threat, that generates the pressures that cause actors to
violate the law. There is no reason to believe that illegal threats are
more compelling than threats to the same interests that arise from
other circumstances that the actor is powerless to change. 113 The
proposed defense also recognizes that the desire to avoid a nonimminent harm may be as compelling as the desire to avoid an imminent harm. 114 Under the new compulsion formulation, therefore, the
fact-finder would consider the source of the threatened harm, its imminence, and the degree of certainty that the harm would occur as
factors bearing on whether the defendant behaved as would an individual of ordinary firmness, rather than as categorical restrictions on
the availability of the defense. 115
Much of the restrictive attitude toward duress can be attributed
to confusion regarding the purpose of the defense 116 and to the
proclivities of a "tougher-minded age," 117 but there are valid reasons
to limit a defense based on the pressure of circumstances. To prevent the defense from exculpating all criminal behavior, 118 courts
must impose some constraints on the types of circumstances that prolikely to be averted - exactly the opposite conclusion is warranted. The duress defense proposed by the drafters of the Model Penal Code rejects many of the traditional limits on the
duress defense, but retains the requirement that the defendant must have responded to an
illegal threat made by another. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1) (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
112. See Note, Prison Escape and Defenses Based on Conditions: A Theory ofSocial Preference, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1183, 1187 (1979) (''The requirement that the threat prompting the
defendant's escape be 'a specific threat of death, forcible attack, or substantial bodily injury'
will often have no bearing on the defendant's danger.") (quoting People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal.
App. 3d 823, 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114-15 (1974)) (emphasis deleted).
113. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, supra note 21, at 834:
The slight reorientation required to expand the concept of duress is to shift one's focus
away from the ''threat" and the "coercion" and toward the act that is impelled under the
circumstances. The question should not be whether the actor can be fairly expected to
resist human threats, but whether he can fairly expect to abstain from an act that seems
required under the circumstances.
114. See text at notes 67-72 supra.
115. Some courts have allowed juries considerable discretion in determining the applicability of the duress defense. See, e.g., People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482,486,220 N.W.2d
212, 214 (1974), affd, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975) (indicating that except in ''the
clearest cases" questions of imminence are to be decided by the jury taking into consideration
"all the surrounding circumstances."); State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 442, 378 A.2d 755, 765
(1977) ("In charging the jury . . . the trial judge should advert to this factor of immediacy, as
well as the gravity of the harm threatened, the seriousness of the crime committed, the identity
of the person endangered, the possibilities for escape or resistance and the opportunities for
seeking official assistance. He should also emphasize that the applicable standard for judging
the defendant's excuse is the 'person of reasonable firmness in [the defendant's] situation.' ").
116. See State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 436, 378 A.2d 755, 762 (1977).
117. Rhode Island Rec. Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir.
1949).
118. Concern over the possible effects of removing the rigid restrictions that have been
imposed on exceptions to the free will assumption was expressed in United States v. Bailey,
585 F.2d 1087, 1120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), revd, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
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vide a legally recognized excuse. And society's interest in deterring
illegal conduct may also justify limiting the scope of the defense.
Although the ability of criminal sanctions to deter "compelled" conduct has been questioned, 119 in most cases there is at least a possibility that sanctions will have some deterrent value. 120 Over time,
punishment might indirectly deter socially undesirable conduct by
raising the standard of reasonable behavior in the face of dire
circumstances.
These considerations, however, do not justify limitations, such as
the human threat requirement, that are unrelated either to the quantum of pressure on the actor or to the degree of resistance that society requires of him. Society's purposes can be served by requiring
that the actor be faced with circumstances threatening death or serious injury to himself or someone close to him. It is in these situations that actors are most likely to fail to make the socially desirable
choice, and least likely to be deterred by the threat of criminal sanctions.121 When lesser interests are threatened, or when the individual threatened is not close to the actor, unreasonable behavior is less
likely to occur and punishment is more likely to deter. The proposed
defense's limitation, therefore, corresponds more closely with both
the typical individual's response to inevitable choice situations and
society's need for restrictions on the defense than does the traditional
human source requirement.
Since courts applying the proposed defense would look not to the
source of the threat, but to the amount of pressure that would cause
an individual of ordinary firmness and respect for the law to violate
the law, 122 it might be objected that the defense is standardless. 123
119. See note 35 supra.
120. The ability of the law to deter illegal conduct by people acting under duress is a long
debated, but still unsettled, question. Stephen argued that "it is at the moment when temptation is strongest that the law should speak most clearly and emphatically to the contrary." 2 J.
STEPHEN, supra note 3~, at 107. Others have responded that the law can never effectively offset
a threat of imminent injury to an actor. If the actor is willing to incur the injury rather than
violate the law, it will stem from "other motives than the fear of legal punishment." Arp v.
State, 97 Ala. 5, 12, 12 So. 301, 303 (1893). These positions are not wholly inconsistent. In
extreme cases (for example, a threat of immediate death), the law almost certainly has no
deterrent- value. However, there are many pressures on individuals (even pressures great
enough to compel an ordinary person to violate the law) that can probably be effectively countered on some occasions by a sufficiently severe sanction. The difficult question is whether the
severity of the sanction required to offset the threat is so harsh that society would consider
imposition of the sanction to be unjust.
121. See note 35 supra.
122. See D.P.P. v. Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653, 670 (Morris, L.J.); MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.09,
Co=ent (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-14 (West 1972); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 40.00 (McKinney 1975); Note, supra note 87, at 1506.
123. The approach suggested here is actually far less discretionary than that suggested elsewhere. Several scholars have suggested that in determining whether the duress was sufficient to
excuse the actor's conduct, the court should focus on the particular capacities of the defendant,
rather than employing standards such as ''the reasonable man." See Fletcher, supra note 16;
Newman & Weitzer, supra note 32.
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But juries undertake similar inquiries in many cases. 124 More important, the rigid guidelines of the current approach may belie its
application in practice. If the law does not reflect the community's
sense of justice, many cases will be screened out by police officers or
prosecutors, or will result in acquittals because juries will temper the
law's effect. 125 The proposed modification adds no discretion to the
system, and is a more open approach for the law to take. 126
Taken together, the compulsion and choice of evils defenses proposed here would cover all three of the fact situations identified in
the theoretical framework. Both defenses are limited by a concept
that is central to criminal law - the reasonable man. They thus
harmonize the current formulation of the necessity defense with generally accepted principles without departing radically from those
principles.
II.

APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED DEFENSES TO
DEPROGRAMMING CASES

A. .Deprogramming and the "Choice ef Evils" .Defense
Actors may successfully advance the choice of evils defense only
if they entertained an honest and reasonable belief that the harm
likely to be avoided by deprogramminp; clearly outweighed the harm
likely to be caused. 127 Several problems inhere in such a balancing
process. First, the variety of cult practices, deprogramming therapies, and experiences of individual cult members renders meaning124. For example, juries are entrusted with the task of deciding whether there is sufficient
provocation to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter. Similarly, cases involving a determination of negligence tum on an assessment of how a "reasonable man" would behave in a
particular factual situation. See generally
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS
§ 32 (4th ed. 1971).
125. See Arnolds & Garland, supra note 11, at 298. These informal methods of deciding
controversies are particularly evident in deprogramming situations, where law enforcement
officials have been extremely reluctant to impose punishment on parents. See Le Moult, supra
note 4, at 608; Note, supra note 4, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 1253 (''The element of scate action in
self-help situations was passive: police declined to intervene, viewing the kidnappings as 'family matters' best resolved outside the courts; grand juries refused to indict and petit juries to
convict the abductors.") (footnotes omitted).
126. As an alternative to exculpating defendants, courts might consider the defense outlined here to be simply a basis for mitigation of punishment. The justification for this i,ipproach would be that the perceived injustice of imposing penalties on actors who were
influenced by substantial external pressures is outweighed by the need to deter illegal conduct.
Bv making compulsion a basis for mitigation, courts would recognize that compelled actors are
not as blameworthy as actors who violated the law without external pressures, but would also
retain some penalty in the hope of deterring violations of the law. The same approach might
be taken for actors who establish an "imperfect" compulsion defense -i.e., the pressures were
sufficient to meet the first two tests suggested earlier, but the actor's response to the pressure
was not understandable. Lafave and Scott have suggested that an actor killing under duress
might be convicted of manslaughter rather than murder, and this approach has been followed
in two state codes. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 12, at 585.
127. See text following note 54supra.
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less many general conclusions regarding the harms caused and
avoided. 128 Second, average defendants may not fully appreciate the
scope of the harms caused or may consider certain "harms" as
avoided when, in legal contemplation, no "harm" exists. Reasonable
normative mistakes 129 of this kind should preclude punishment.
This section attempts to address these problems. After surveying
the possible harms caused and avoided by deprogramming, it considers the possibility that the actor made a reasonable normative
mistake. Finally, the section examines the relevance oflegal alternatives to deprogramming. It concludes that the choice of evils defense
will rarely avail defendants in deprogramming cases.

I. Harms Caused
Attempts to deprogram cult members are likely to cause two general types of harms. 130 The most obvious is violation of the criminal
laws that prohibit the various actions of deprogrammers. These
criminal aspects of deprogramming vary little from case to case:
Most deprogrammings involve abducting the cult member and confining him for several days. 131 The range of crimes involved may
thus be said "to involve kidnapping at the very least, quite often assault and battery, almost invariably conspiracy to commit a crime,
and illegal restraint." 132 Deprogrammers attempt to discount the
magnitude of these harms by arguing that deprogramming is temporary and benevolently motivated. 133 They also point to former cult
members' thankful declarations as proof that deprogramming is, on
balance, beneficial. 134 It is difficult, however, to appreciate the relevance of such expressions of gratitude. 135 And neither its temporary
128. Anthony, The Fact Pal/em Behind the .Deprogramming Controversy: An Analysis and
anAltemative, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 73, 80 (1980) ("Much of the disagreement
about the mental health effects of the movements results because people are comparing entirely different entities. One of the clearest generalizations that emerges from studies of these
effects is that the mental health implications of unconventional religions vary tremendously
from group to group."); Panel .Discussion, supra note 9, at I 16.
129. See text at note 22 supra.
130. Harms to the individual from deprogramming are discussed at note 180 iefra.
131. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. For a more graphic description of the
deprogramming process, see Affidavit of Walter Robert Tayler, In re Guardianship of Walter
Tayler, No. P-76-1228 (Okla. Co. P. Ct. Aug. 12, 1978), reprinted in Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue, supra note 8, at 65-67 ("My monastic clothes were ripped off me while four
persons held me down. My cross or crucifix was taken away from me. . . . Mr. Howard
discussed his sexual exploits and fornications and encouraged me to have sexual intercourse,"),
132. T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, supra note 7, at 63.
133. See T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, supra note 7, at 77.
134. See, e.g. , Panel .Discussion, supra note 9, at 106 (statement of Marcia Rudin), Patrick
claims a success rate of over 90% (with "success" presumably demonstrated by a decision not
to return to the cult). Note, supra note 4, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. at 152 n.147. Such claims are
obviously highly self-serving, but, unfortunately, the accuracy of this estimate has not been
objectively evaluated by researchers.
135. The laws violated by deprogrammers, of course, do not function solely to protect cult
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nature nor its benevolent purpose are legally acceptable justifications
for criminal conduct. 1J6
Less obvious, but no less significant than the criminal violations,
is the threat that deprogramming poses to freedom of religion. 137
Most of the characteristics of cult membership on which deprogrammers rely to justify their activities - isolation from the rest of society, devotion to the cult as a surrogate family, and adherence to
peculiar beliefs and practices - are precisely those that give rise to
first amendment interests. 138 Because the dogma of most cults is
"sincere and meaningful" and "occupies in the life of its possessor a
place parallel to that filled by" conventional notions of a divine being, 139 the first amendment fully protects the beliefs and practices of
cult members. 140 Interference with those beliefs and practices directly affects deprogrammed individuals, and also harms the cults: 141
In addition to depriving cults of members' services and support,
deprogramming may generate a chilling effect that hampers their
members. See W. LAFAVE &A. Scorr,supra note 12, at 408. See also J. HALL,supra note 18,
at 217. Moreover, these declarations may come from former cult members who have accepted
the arguments of deprogrammers as a means of rationalizing their earlier involvement in the
cult. See note 180 infra.
136. See Part I, Section B supra.
137. See, e.g., Co=ent, supra note 4, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 751; Note, supra note
4, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 1248 n.8.
138. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,227 (1972) {holding that application to Amish
sect of compulsory school attendance laws amounted to "severe interference with religious
freedom"). In Yoder, the Court was careful to rely on the long history and apparent sincerity
of the Amish sect, as well as the convincing demonstration that the sect's practices complemented, rather than frustrated, the underlying purpose of compulsory school attendance laws.
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to distinguish on a principled basis the Amish lifestyle from
cult lifestyles. In both, "religion pervades and determines virtually [the] entire way of life,
regulating it with the detail of the Talmudic diet through the strictly enforced rules of the
church co=unity." 406 U.S. at 216. Further, the Court noted in Yoder that forcing the sect
to conform with the law in question posed "a very real threat of undermining the Amish
community and religious practice as it exists today; they must either abandon belief and be
assimilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate to some other . . . more tolerant
region." 406 U.S. at 218. The same observation can be made with respect to many modem
day cults vis-a-vis deprogramming.
139. United States v Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
140. See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493 (1961) (invalidating state statute requiring
declaration of belief in God as condition for holding public office).
141. The Supreme Court held long ago: ''The law knows no heresy, and is committed
to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary
religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine
... is unquestioned." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29 (1872), quoted in Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710-11 (1975).
As a general matter, the Court has long viewed a group's constitutional rights as indistinguishable from that ofits members. See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1975);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957) (plurality). Interference with a cult member's practice of religious beliefs is, therefore,
simultaneously an interference with the rights of the cult, because the rights of the cult and the
cult member in connection with the free exercise of religious beliefs "are in every practical
sense identical." NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958).

298

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 80:271

recruiting efforts. 142 It is thus likely to injure substantially first
amendment interests.
The nature of the two interests threatened by deprogramming is
such that courts should not allow the "success" of a particular attempt to mitigate the harms caused. The laws that deprogrammers
violate exist not only to protect individual cult members, but also
because society has an interest in discouraging parents, friends, and
deprogrammers from taking the law into their own hands regardless
of the likelihood that they would succeed. As a practical matter,
moreover, courts will encounter only cases where the deprogramming failed. The difficulties in attempting to make a post hoc assessment of the likelihood of success and the absence of objective data
regarding success rates counsel against exculpating defendants on
the basis of fact-specific inquiries into the likelihood that they would
succeed. 143
2. Harms Avoided

Although its proponents argue that deprogramming avoids a
wide variety of evils, 144 one factor - the member's capacity to consent to the harms alleged - significantly affects the weight that
courts should give to them. Most of these evils necessitate intervention only if the cult member was incapable of voluntarily assenting
to them. No compelling reason supports the choice of evils defense
where the member voluntarily chose to accept the cult's living conditions.145 Indeed, there appear to be no necessity cases in which a
party who sought to protect a third person from a voluntarily assumed harm raised the defense. 146 Our society attaches great value
to individual freedom, and deprogrammers impose substantial
142. This sort of inquiry was specifically cited as one factor establishing the right of a civil
rights group to assert the constitutional rights of its members in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1958).
143. Such an inquiry would require some objective data regarding the "success" rate of
deprogramming. To date, only self-serving claims of success have been made by deprogrammers. See note 134 supra.
144. For critical analyses of cults, see sources cited in note 4 supra.
145. Certain consensual harms, however, may be serious enough to warrant intervention
and justify application of the choice of evils defense. One can imagine, for example, the choice
of evils defense being raised where the actor sought to prevent drug abuse or suicide.
146. There are two cases that arguably present such a situation. In Leigh v. Gladstone, 26
T.L.R. 139 (K.B. 1909), the court held that prison officers who forcibly fed a prisoner on a
hunger strike to protect her health had acted lawfully. It has been suggested, however, that the
benefit justifying this action was the need for prisOii disdpline, and hence the case "is not
authority for any wider principle that injury may lawfuly be caused to save a person from
himself." Glazebrook, supra note 11, at 99. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at § 234. In
Humphries v. Connor, 17 Ir. C.L.R. 1 (Q.B. 1864), the defendant constable had removed an
emblem from a person, because the emblem offended several persons nearby. The constable
claimed that he removed the emblem to protect the wearer. The court acquitted the constable
because "it was defendant's duty as a constable to preserve the public peace, and to prevent the
breach of it by disturbance or otherwise." 17 Ir. C.L.R. at 6 (O'Brien, J.). Hence, the court
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harms when they deprive cult members of their free choice. 147
The belief that deprogramming avoids nonconsensual harms is
based on the premise that consent requires simultaneous capacity
and knowledge. 148 Cults may deceive potential members, and prevent them from obtaining the knowledge required for consent. 149
And some cults use manipulative techniques - frequently described
as "coercieve persuasion," "thought control," or "brainwashing" that may prevent recruits from having the capacity to consent once
they have been given sufficient information. 150 The deprogrammers'
primary argument, then, is that cults manipulate or brainwash recruits into adhering to cult dogma.1s 1
suggested that the benefit justifying intervention was the need for public order, rather than a
specific need to protect the defendant.
Glazebrook suggests that necessity is not applicable to rescuers who act against the consent
of the rescued party. Glazebrook, supra note 11, at 98-99. Elsewhere it has been suggested
that necessity would be applicable if a defendant prevented another person from attempting to
commit suicide.
147. See generally J. MILL, ON LIBERTY {London 1859).
148. Delgado, supra note 4, at 49.
149. C. STONER & J. PARKE, ALL Goo's CHILDREN 61 (1977) ("cult recruiters may carefully avoid or even deny the group is a religion"). But see Robbins, in Panel Discussion, supra
note 9, at 95.
150. See Delgado, supra note 4, at 54-56.
151. See Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States ofMind: Towards a Defense Theoryfor the
Coercively Persuaded ("Brainwashed'? Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REV. I, 1-6 (1978), for an attempt to analyze the factors involved in coercive persuasion. For the most comprehensive
treatment of the brainwashing argument as applied to cults, see Delgado, supra note 4. See
also VERMONT GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED DECEPTIVE, FRAUDULENT AND CRIMINAL PRACTICES OF VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE STATE 5 (Jan. 1977) [hereinafter cited as VERMONT SENATE COMM.].
At least one "cult" has taken legal action in response to criticism in the popular press.
Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church filed a libel suit that resulted in "one of the
longest civil trials in recent British history." N.Y. Times, Apr. I, 1981, at 4, col. I. The paper
had warned that the Church ''woos to its ways young people who walk out on their everyday
lives, leave behind families in despair." A parent of a former Church member described the
members as "robots, glassy-eyed and mindless, programmed as soldiers in this vast fund-raising army with no goals or ideas, except as followers of the half-baked ravings of Moon, who
lived in splendor while his followers lived in forced penury." Id, at l, col. 2, and at 4, col. l.
After hearing 117 witnesses during the five-month trial, the jury "ordered the group (i.e., the
Unification Church) to pay court costs estimated at nearly $2 million [and] also unanimously
reco=ended that the church's tax-free status 'be investigated by the Inland Revenue Department on the grounds that it is a political organization.'" Id, at l, cols. 1-2.
The brainwashing issue has also received judicial attention. In Peterson v. Sorlien, 299
N.W.2d 123 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981), the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected
a cult member's false imprisonment claim against her parents because of the cult's coercive
methods. 299 N.W.2d at 128-29. Another court seemed to accept the notion that brainwashing was a ~~ibility in cult settings, but concluded that brainwashing was not actionable.
People v. Murphy, 98 Misc. 2d 235, 243, 413 N.Y.S.2d 540, 545 (1977). See also Helander v.
Unification Church, l Fam. L. Rep. 2797 (D.C. Super. Ct., Family Div. Sept. 23, 1975). Other
courts have suggested that the evidence is not conclusive either way. See Turner v. Unification
Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 376 (D.R.!. 1978), ajfd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 980-81, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 251 (1977). See also 123 CONG.
REc. 27,091 (1977) (Department of Justice takes position that "evidence that sect members do
not have the capacity to exercise a free will is inconclusive").
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The effectiveness of thought control techniques is poorly understood, 152 but scholars are increasingly recognizing the possibility of
manipulation. 153 New recruits are often quite suggestible, 154 and the
cult experience is frequently designed to reduce drastically the resistance of recruits to indoctrination. 155 As a result, cult leaders may
substantially influence recruits' thinking. 156 These factors led the
New York Charity Frauds Bureau to conclude, after investigating
152. See Reich, Brainwashing, Psychiatry, and the Law, 39 PSYCH. 400, 402-03 (1976); Shapiro, .Destructive Cultism, AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN, Nov. 1977, at 83 (suggesting that further research on the prevention of "destructive cultism" and treatment is necessary). Doubt has also
been expressed concerning the possibility of resolving questions about brainwashing in a
courtroom. See Dressler, Professor .Delgado's "Brainwashing" .Defense: Courting a .Determinisl
Legal System, 63 MINN. L. REV. 335, 354-56 (1979); Reich,supra. But see Delgado,supra note
151, at 26-27.
153. See sources cited in Delgado, supra note 151, at 1-3 nn.1-11 & 16. Delgado claims
that the existence of thought control "is attested to by voluminous accounts of those who have
experienced it, as well as reports of scientific investigators who have studied it. The body of
professional literature related to thought reform is extensive." Id at 22-23 (footnotes omitted).
154. Many recruits are experiencing emotional problems before becoming involved with
the cult. See Clark, supra note 2, at 279-80. Some cults deliberately seek out emotionally
disturbed individuals. Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 130 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1031 (1981). Other recruits desire precisely the sort of lifestyle that cults appear to offer
-an opportunity to devote their lives to God, to work for socially desirable causes, and to live
in a communal setting. J. MAcCOLLAM, supra note 2, at 19. Their resulting eagerness to
accept the cult's doctrine is increased by the friendliness and enthusiasm of the other members.
See Levine, supra note 2, at 35; Lofland, "Becoming a World-Saver" Revisited, 20 AM. BEHAV•
!ORAL Sci. 805, 811-13 (1977). The recruits' desire to be part of the group, at least for a few
days, may prevent them from critically analyzing the doctrines to which they are exposed.
155. The techniques used by cults include a rigorous daily routine desigoed to exhaust the
recruits physically, Lofland, supra note 154, at 810, ceremonies desigoed to produce emotional
euphoria, see, e.g., F. CONWAY & J. SPIEGELMAN, SNAPPING (1978), and deprivation of food
and sleep,see T. PATRICK& T. DuLACK,supra note 7, at 75-76. Some cults go to great lengths
to prevent recruits from spending any time alone because this would give them an opportunity
to consider more carefully the information to which they are being exposed. Levine, supra
note 2, at 35; Rudin, supra note 2, at 19.
156. The cumulative effect of the cults' techniques may leave the recruits' minds in a state
of dissociation. See F. CONWAY &J. SPIEGELMAN,supra note 155, at 184; Clark,supra note 2,
at 280; Rudin, supra note 2, at 19-20. At this point, cult leaders can exert substantial influence
over recruits' thinking. The leaders completely control the information that the recruits receive and the means of exposure. See generally Lofland, supra note 154, at 809-11. Recruits
are encouraged to stop questioning the information and to accept the cult's doctrines and lifestyle. F. CONWAY & J. SPIEGELMAN, supra note 155, at 57; Delgado, supra note 4, at 14. The
recruits' identification with, and acceptance of, their new environment is also fostered by attempts to isolate them from their past and the outside world. See Investigating the Effects of
Some Religious Cults on the Health and Welfare of their Converts (statement of John Clark to
the Vermont Senate Comm. for the Investigation of Alleged Deceptive, Fraudulent and Criminal Practices of Various Organizations in the State) (Aug. 18, 1976); Lofland, supra note 154, at
810. After the recruits have accepted the cult, loyalty may be maintained by manipulating the
members' feelings of guilt, see Levine, supra note 2, at 36; Rudin, supra note 2, at 26, and fear,
see VERMONT SENATE CoMM., supra note 151; California Senate Select Comm. on Children
and Youth, Hearing on the Impact ofCults on Today's Youth 27 (Aug. 24, 1974); Lofland, supra
note 154, at 813; Singer, Coming Out ofthe Cults, PSYCH. TODAY, Jan. 1979, at 72, 79, and by
establishing a very regimented lifestyle within which the member has little reason or opportunity to question the cult, see Delgado, supra note 4, at 24; Singer, supra, at 76. Moreover,
because new members have lost touch with the outside world, they may become psychologically dependent on the cult during their continued devotion. See Clark, supra note 2, at 280.
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the Children of God, that the group had employed "brainwashing
techniques" to accomplish "a total assault on the psyche" of its
members. 157 Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in rejecting a
Way International member's claim that her deprogramming constituted false imprisonment, stated that the group's members suffered a
"severe impairment of autonomy and ability to think
independently." 158
Other scholars have challenged these views of the cult indoctrination process. 159 They suggest that the cults' techniques do not di.ffer
significantly from those of some traditional religions 160 and other institutions.161 Critics of deprogramming also object to the use of
terms such as "brainwashing" because acceptance of this view of
conversion may rationalize religious persecution. 162 These scholars
question the cults' ability to brainwash members, 163 and suggest that
acceptance of a cult's lifestyle does not evince brainwashing: Many
individuals may, consciously or subconsciously, seek out an authori157. NEW YORK ATTORNEY GENERAL, FINAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CHILDREN OF Goo 3 I.
158. Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
159. See Anthony, supra note 128, at 79; Robbins, Religious Movements, the State, and the
Law: Reconceptualizing "the Cult Problem," 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33 (1980);
Robbins & Anthony, New Religions, Families and Brainwashing, SOCIETY, May-June 1978, at
77-78; Robbins, Anthony & Richardson, Theory and Research on Today's New Religions, 39
Soc. ANALYSIS 95, 111 (1978); Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue, supra note 8.
160. See, e.g., Robbins & Anthony, supra note 159, at 79:
The logic [of the deprogramming advocates'] argument, then, would lead either to legal
suppression of monasteries, fraternities, the Boy Scouts, and Alcoholics Anonymous, or to
granting courts a discretionary authority in suppressing membership in voluntary associations, which is inconsistent with our legal traditions.
See generally E. ANDREWS, THE COMMUNITY INDUSTRIES OF THE SHAKERS 12-13 (1933); w.
JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (1902).
[The Shakers] consecrated themselves and their property to God, holding all their goods
in common but owning nothing; . . . they Jed celibate lives; . . . they were the recipients
of strange visions and the first spiritualists in America; . . . early meetings were characterized by unrestrained emotions and unbridled ecstacies of spirit and body; . . . they did
not vote nor run for public office . . . . [They] considered themselves a body of saints,
whose mission it was to redeem themselves and others from the sins of worldliness and
carnal nature.
E. ANDREWS, supra, at 12-13.
161. Robbins & Anthony, supra note 159, at 79.
162. See Robbins & Anthony, supra note 159, at 78; Shupe, Spielmann & Stigall,
Deprogramming: The New Exorcism, 20 AM. BEHAVIORAL Sci. 941, 951 (1977); Szasz, Patty
Hearst's Conversion: Some Call it Brainwashing, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 6, 1976, at JO.
163. See Szasz, supra note 162, at 10-1 I.
Like many dramatic terms, "brainwashing" is a metaphor. A person can no more wash
another's brain with coercion or conversation than he can make him bleed with a cutting
remark. If there is no such thing as brainwashing, what does this metaphor stand for? It
stands for one of the most universal human experiences and events, namely for one person influencing another. However, we do not call all types of personal or psychological
influences "brainwashing." We reserve this term for influences of which we disapprove.
Id at 11. For a brief account of the historical development of the term "brainwashing," see
Note, supra note 4, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. at 1124-32.
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tarian lifestyle. 164
The issue that emerges from this debate is one over which, as one
court has noted, "[r]easonable minds could differ," 165 but courts
should not consider brainwashing itself as a harm avoided by
deprogramming. The recruiting and indoctrinating activities that
critics label brainwashing constitute protected advocacy of religious
beliefs. 166 The brainwashing argument may assume that there are
"normal" religious beliefs and "constructive" religious practices
from which cults deviate and that deprogramming allows individuals
to appreciate. 167 It also assumes that some individuals are capable of
influencing others in a manner so clearly contrary to their best interests that it is permissible to restrict the infiuence. 168 It overlooks,
however, the Supreme Court's consistent rejection of both the former169 and the latter170 assumptions.
Brainwashing itself is not cognizable as a harm avoided by
deprogramming, but cult membership may subject individuals to
several other types of harm as well. Courts should thus consider
whether these alleged harms are sufficiently serious to warrant intervention. Deprogrammers argue first that cults defraud members into
devoting their efforts, if not their lives, to activities that merely ag164. See Robbins & Anthony, supra note 159, at 82.
165. Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 981, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 251 (1977).
166. These activities may, however, be subjected to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions. See Heffron v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., IOI S. Ct.
2559, 2566 (1981) (holding that state fair rule limiting solicitation to stationary booths on fairground premises does not violate first amendment; peripatetic solicitation ritual has "no special claim to First Amendment protection as compared to that of other religions who also
distribute literature and solicit funds").
167. The assumption is implicit. Although a deprogrammer might not attempt to
reprogram a cult member into any particular religious school, see T. PATRICK & T. DULACK,
supra note 7, at 77 ("Once . . . deprogrammed (a cult member] is absolutely free to do
whatever he wants to do."), the very act of deprogramming implies that a cult member's current religious views are "wrong" or not what the cult member would choose ifhe or she were
exercising "free will." See also Robbins, supra note 159, at 38 (''the concepts of mind control
and brainwashing . . . mask a latent concern for the deviant contents of beliefs and bizarre
results").
168. This assumption is also implicit. See T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, supra note 7, at 20
("Moon's a crook, plain and simple. They're all crooks. You name 'em. Hare Krishna. The
Divine Light Mission. Guru Maharaj Ji. The New Testament Missionary Fellowship.
Brother Julius. Love Israel. The Children of God. Not a brown penny's worth of difference
between any of 'em.").
169. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down state
statute requiring flag salute as violative of first amendment as applied to children whose religion prohibited such displays of nationalism and patriotism).
170. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940):
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In
both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade
others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration,
to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent. . . . But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right
conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.
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grandize cult leaders. 171 Although there may be some truth to this
charge, 172 the government lacks authority to challenge solicitation of
funds on the ground that the cult's dogma is false. 173 Because the
Constitution forbids state interference with cults' fund-raising activities, private individuals cannot claim that courts should weigh such
activities on the harm avoided side of the choice of evils balance. 174
Deprogrammers argue, and some evidence suggests, that cult indoctrination methods can cause serious psychological damage.
Many members appear unable to exercise independent judgment, 175
and some research indicates that they may suffer serious, and perhaps permanent, cognitive damage. 176 Cult members' apparent dissociation, 177 however, does not differ substantially from euphoric
states that result from other, well-accepted religious activites. 178
Listlessness, lethargy, and an inability to direct one's personal affairs
without guidance are surely unfortunate, but not serious enough to
justify forcible deprogramming. There is respectable evidence,
moreover, that for some individuals cult membership may be psychologically beneficial, 179 and deprogramming psychologically damaging.180 Finally, since states have generally declined to regulate
cult practices to protect the psychological well-being of members, 181
171. See Delgado, supra note 4, at 44-45.
172. See, e.g., Rudin, supra note 2, at 27 n.66 (collecting topical newspaper accounts of the
opulent lifestyle of many cult leaders).
173. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944). See Schaumburg v. Citizens for
Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632, 637 (1980).
174. See text at notes 55-57 supra.
175. See Delgado, supra note 4, at 21-22; Shapiro, supra note 152, at 83.
176. See VERMONT SENATE COMM., supra note 151 (statement of John Clark); Clark,
supra note 2, at 281; Delgado, supra note 4, at 14-15; Levine, supra note 2, at 36.
177. See note 156 supra.
178. See, e.g., W. JAMES, supra note 160, at 62-77.
179. Research by Ungerleider and Wellisch led them to conclude that "[n]o data emerged
from intellectual, personality, or mental status testing to suggest that any of these subjects are
unable or even limited in their ability to make sound judgments and legal decisions as related
to their persons and property." Ungerleider & Wallisch, Coercive Persuasion (Brainwashing),
Religious Cults, and J)eprogramming, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 279, 281 (1979). Other researchers
have reported a reduction in neurotic stress as a result of cult membership. Galanter, Rabkin,
Rabkin & Deutsch, supra note 4, at 168 ("Affiliation with the Unification Church apparently
provided considerable and sustained relief from neurotic distress.").
180. Because deprogramming provides former cult members with a means to deny personal responsibility for their involvement with the cult, it may be a harmful type of therapy;
former members may be better off if they come to grips with the personal reasons that led them
to accept the cult's authoritarian lifestyle. See Panel i)iscussion, supra note 9, at 117, 120-21
(statement of Dick Anthony); Anthony, supra note 159, at 86. The risks of deprogramming are
exacerbated by the questionable qualifications of many of those involved and the possibility
that some deprogrammers are financially, rather than benevolently, motivated, see Gutman,
Constitutional and Legal i)imensions of J)eprogramming, in Deprogramming: Documenting
the Issue, supra note 8, at 209. But see T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, supra note 7, at 159.
181. Most states have statutes that allow for the appointment of guardians or conservators
for those individuals incapable of managing their own property or affairs. At least one court
decision involving deprogramming has held a conservatorship statute unacceptably vague in-
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it is not clear that the legislatures would condone deprogramming
for that purpose. 182 Courts should, therefore, treat psychological
problems as a harm avoided only where, under conventional standards of legal competency, the cult member was incapable of exercising independent judgment.
Deprogramming may also avert physical injuries that some cult
members suffer. The rigorous routine, 183 and dangerous activities of
many cults, 184 combined with inadequate nutrition, lack of sleep,
and substandard living quarters, can jeopardize their members'
physical health. The aversion of some cults to medical care magnifies this risk. 185 And preventing physical injury, particularly if permanent, falls within the scope of state police power186 because the
value that society places on human life outweighs the value of unfettered practice of religious beliefs. 187 It is reasonable, therefore, to
argue that a deprogrammer may intervene, as the state's "agent," to
prevent serious physical injury.188
sofar as it allowed for the appointment of a conservator whenever the prospective conservatee
''was likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing persons." Katz v. Superior
Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 240 n.5 (1977). The Katz court stated that "in
the absence of such actions as render the adult believer himself gravely disabled as defined in
the law of this state, the processes of this state cannot be used to deprive the believer of his
freedom of action and to subject him to involuntary treatment." 73 Cal. App. 3d at 989, 141
Cal. Rptr. at 256.
182. The defendant invoking the choice of evils defense is not free to define subjectively
the sorts of harms that might justify violating the law; the applicability of the defense depends
upon whether it is reasonable to believe that the legislature would condone violating the law to
prevent the harm in question. See text at notes 55-57 supra. It is not clear that the state could
"police" the psychological well-being of cult members by regulating the practices that
deprogrammers claim are injurious enough to justify deprogramming. Although the state can
intervene to protect children and others incapable of caring for themselves, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944), the Supreme Court has stated that in cases where a free
exercise claim has been rejected that "[t]he conduct or actions so regulated have invariably
posed some substantial threat to public sefety, peace or order." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398,403 (1963) (emphasis added). See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,215 (1972). It is thus
far from clear that the state could regulate or restrict religious practices to prevent psychological harms that neither threaten the general welfare nor directly endanger the cult member's
physical well-being.
183. See note 155 supra.
184. See, e.g., note 196 in.fra.
185. See Clark, supra note 2, at 280; Delgado, S11pra note 4, at 19; Rudin, supra note 2, at
31-32 (concluding that cult membership "may be threatening to life itself").
186. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,308 (1940); Reynold v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 163 (1879).
187. State regulation of practices that endanger health has long been justified on the
ground that the free exercise of religion "embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be."
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
188. The more difficult question is what degree of physical harm is required before forcible
intervention is justified. Not all physical harms would "clearly outweigh" the harms caused by
deprogramming. Inadequate sleep or a less than optimal diet would seem insufficient to justify
deprogramming because, as a general matter, these conditions do not threaten irreparable injury. But practices that may lead to irreparable physical injury should justify intervention.
There may also be a distinction between abduction and confinement and deprogramming.
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The Reasonable Belief Requirement and Alternatives to
Deprogramming

To assert the choice of evils defense successfully, defendants
must have reasonably believed that deprogramming was necessary
and that the harms likely to be avoided clearly outweighed the
harms likely to be caused. 189 Because the average defendant may
tend to underestimate the harms caused by deprogramming and
overestimate the harms avoided, defendants may be able to argue
convincingly that they made a reasonable normative mistake in balancing the harms. Proper instructions, however, will minimize the
possibility that juries will exculpate defendants whose mistake was
unreasonable. Courts should instruct juries to apply the same standard of reasonableness used in other areas of the law. 190 Under this
standard, most parents will be held criminally liable for deprogramming except where deprogramming is clearly justified. And professional deprogrammers, who are required by the reasonable man
standard to use any special skill, knowledge, or experience that they
possess or should possess, will almost never be exonerated.
At a minimum, the reasonable belief requirement demands some
investigation of the practices of the particular cult in question and of
their effects on the individual to be deprogrammed. Because cult
practices and the experiences of individual members vary widely, 191
general information will not suffice; defendants must demonstrate
that they had specific grounds for believing that deprogramming was
clearly justified. But contact between the parent and the cult member might have suggested that the child is incapable of exercising
independent judgment, 192 or that cult membership threatens serious
and irreparable injury. 193 Parents may also receive mail from the
child that is so out of character that it provides a reasonable ground
to believe that his faculties have deteriorated. 194 And parents' suspicions may reasonably be aroused by cults' efforts to prevent contact
with their children. 195 The parents' beliefs, based on t1?-ese observaAlthough abduction might be necessary in some cases to prevent the cult member from physical harm, the need for deprogramming is less clear. Many observers point out that deprogramming is as coercive as the practices that the cults allegedly engage in. See Sage, The War on
Cults, HUMAN BEHAVIOR, Oct. 1976, at 40, 45; Shupe, Spielman & Stigall, supra note 162, at
951; Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue, supra note 8, at 195 (statement of Allen
Gerson).
189. See text following note 54 supra.
190. See, e.g., w. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 345 (1971).
191. See text at note 128 supra.
192. See Clark, supra note 2, at 280. Members have been described as appearing glassyeyed and constantly smiling. See Shapiro, supra note 152, at 83.
193. See notes 175-76 supra and accompanying text.
194. See Delgado, supra note 4, at 18 n.102.
195. See Rudin, supra note 2, at 28 ("Families often are prevented from locating or communicating privately with their loved ones."). Joel MacCollam asks:
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tions, may be reinforced by information about the cult. Evidence
from former cult members, for example, may indicate that the cult's
activities seriously threaten members' health. If defendants produce
substantial evidence of this type, there may be a reasonable basis for
their belief that cult membership is harmful, and that the child is
incapable of preventing or consenting to the harm. 196
Even in cases where intervention appears warranted, parents and
deprogrammers must search for viable legal alternatives. In most
states, judicial conservatorships or guardianship proceedings are
available to parents and friends of cult members. 197 A number of
parents have used these proceedings successfully. 198 Where such
proceedings are available, failure to use them should ordinarily lead
courts to deny the choice of evils defense. Only if defendants can
demonstrate that resort to legal proceedings would not prevent serious injury to the cult member should courts accept the defense.
The choice of evils defense will thus rarely exonerate parents of
adult cult members, and will virtually never exonerate professional
deprogrammers. Deprogramming constitutes a clearly lesser evil
only if the cult member appears incapable of exercising independent
judgment or risks severe physical injury. Even in these situations,
courts should reject the defense if viable legal alternatives were
available.
If the children are indeed not victims of mind control but are in a totally voluntary association with the religious group, why are the cults so adverse to offering a "cooling oft"
period where the convert can go home and prove to his parents that he is not at all a
victim of coercion but actually acting out of his own free will?
J. MAcCoLLAM, supra note 2, at 141 (emphasis in original).

196. An example of such a situation is the Washington deprogramming case, where the
defense claims the parents' beliefs were based in large part on (I) the mother's visit to the cult,
during which the mother found her daughter to be suffering from a disease that severely disfigured her face; the daughter first agreed to go to a doctor, but then declined after the cult leader
denied permission, Memorandum For Defendant at 8, United States v. Patrick, No. CR74320S (W.D. Wash. Dec. II, 1974); (2) later letters from the parents were returned marked
"refused" or "addressee unknown," id.; (3) reports indicated that two cult members had died
after sniffing, from plastic bags, a substance called toluene, id. at 9; a former cult member
informed the parents that this was a common practice in the cult, id. at 17; (4) a friend of the
daughter reported to the parents that during his visit with her she had not said a word to him;
she "simply smiled vacantly and stared at him . . . 'glassy-eyed,' " id. at 11; (5) the former cult
member reported:
One of the "religious" ceremonies used in the cult involved a number of members holding
hands while sitting in a circle, one of them holding metal somehow attached to the room's
electrical outlet. The current was turned on, causing it to run through the bodies of all
those in the circle. One by one, members would leave the circle, increasing the current
being endured by the remainder. The record as to the fewest number willing to so prove
their faith was two, both of whom became frightened when they could not release each
other's hands or the electrified piece of metal. A "religious" spectator had to remove the
plug from the outlet.
Id. at 17-18.
197. See Note, supra note 4, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. at 1108.
198. Id. at 1108-09. But see Katz v. Superior Ct., 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234
(1977).
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B. .Deprogramming and the "Compulsion" .Defense
To decide whether defendants in deprogramming cases may successfully raise the proposed compulsion defense, courts should consider evidence similar to that presented under the choice of evils
defense. The availability of the defense, however, depends not on
the objective desirability of intervention, but on whether the defendant acted understandably. The fact-finder must ask whether individuals of ordinary firmness and respect for the law would behave
similarly in the defendant's position. 199 This necessarily entails examining the identity of the defendant and the circumstances that affected him.
Parents y,,hose children join cults will often have cause for concern about the child's well-being. 200 In many cases, those close to
the child witness sudden and radical changes in personality201 and
lifestyle, frequently accompanied by total rejection of his past. Cult
members are often openly hostile to parents and former friends. 202
To help them to understand these changes,203 parents may tum to
one of a growing number of anticult organizations.204 These organizations introduce parents to former cult members, parents of former
members, and deprogrammers, many of whom urge that the child is
in daµger and must be protected from the cult.205 These factors, and
the close relationship between a parent or friend and the cult member,206 may cause parents or friends to believe that intervention is
199. See text at note 115 supra.
200. See notes 175-77 & 183-85 and accompanying text.
201. See Clark, supra note 2, at 280 (''While in this state, personality changes drastically a fact that often brings terrified parents into the physician's office."); Rudin, supra note 2, at 20
("a complete personality transformation seems to occur''). But see Simmonds, Conversion or
Addiction: Consequences of Joining a Jesus Movement Group, 20 AM. BEHAVIORAL Sci. 909
(1977).
202. See Shapiro, supra note 152, at 81.
203. It has been suggested that because of the emotional distress suffered by the parents of
cult members, ''they are desperately in need of support and understanding." Shapiro, supra
note 152, at 81. See generally J. MAcCOLLAM, supra note 2, at 83 (''Many families have seen
strong and healthy parents reduced to physical or emotional cripples from the exhaustion and
strain under which cult parents often live."); Delgado, supra note 4, at 29 (some parents "have
suffered mental and physical illnesses as a result of the stress of forced separation from and
concern over the welfare of a loved child").
204. See History ofthe Deprogramming Movement, in Deprogramming: Documenting the
Issue, supra note 8, at 12 (suggesting that "a vast underground network of communications,
referrals, transportation, and housing" to be used for deprogrammings has developed). But see
J. MAcCOLLAM, supra note 2, at 125 (responding to this allegation by suggesting that there is,
at most, informal contact between these organizations).
It has been argued that contact is sometimes initiated by the organization, rather than by
the parents. See Step by Step Account ofthe Events Leading lo the Procuring and Issuance ofa
Conservatorship, in Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue, supra note 8, at 44.
205. Id See Simmons, Deprogramming: The Wrong Answer far Concerned Parents, in
Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue, supra note 8, at 202.
206. Courts and commentators have recognized that the emotional pressures caused by a
threat to an individual's child may be just as great as, if not greater than, those resulting from a
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essential.207
Regardless of their motives, many parents will find the decision
to deprogram one of the most difficult and stressful decisions of their
lives.208 At least two courts have recognized the pressure that parents face. In rejecting a cult member's tort action for false imprisonment, a Rhode Island district court stated that "Mrs. Weiss' actions
... arose not from her abhorrence of the Unification Church per se,
but rather arose directly from a solicitude which a mother holds for
her daughter's health and well-being." 209 Similarly, in a Washington criminal deprogrammine case, the court concluded that "the parents who would do less than what Mr. and Mrs. Crampton did for
their daughter Kathe would be less than responsible, loving parents."210 The Washington court's conclusion may seem overstated,
but it is reasonable to conclude that many parents are likely to take
socially undesirable actions on behalf of their children.
In considering the application of the compulsion defense to parents, courts should engage in a three-step inquiry. The initial requirement of an honest and reasonable belief in a threat of serious
injury to the actor or someone close to the actor could be satisfied by
evidence supporting a reasonable belief that the cult threatened the
child's capacity for independent judgment or his physical health.
But general evidence about cults does not provide a reasonable basis
for inferring danger from a particular cult.211 Similarly, the fact that ·
a child dropped out of school to join the cult, standing alone, should
not support an inference of physical or psychological danger. Parents could satisfy the standard by demonstrating that they knew that
the cult had engaged in practices jeopardizing physical or psychological well-being, or if contact with the child led them reasonably to
perceive a risk of such harm.
If this first requirement is met, the court must determine whether
the pressure was sufficient to overcome a reasonable person's resisthreat directed at the individual. See United States v. Gamer, 529 F.2d 962, 969-71 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406, 408 n.1 (9th Cir.
1975); State v. Toscano, 74 NJ. 421,437,378 A.2d 755, 763 (1977); Hersey & Avins, supra note
102, at 286.
207. The explanation for parents' actions may be more complicated. Several authorities
suggest that parents feel a sense of guilt, and perhaps hostility, when their children reject them,
their lifestyle, and their values. Rather than accepting their "failure," parents may rationalize
that the cult has victimized their child. See Robbins & Anthony, supra note 159, at 81; Sage,
supra note 188, at 45.
208. See J. MAcCOLLAM, supra note 2, at 72. Besides requiring a large investment of time
and money, see Simmons, supra note 205, parents risk criminal and tort liability, and, more
realistically, permanently destroying their relationship with the child, see Anthony, supra note
128, at 86.
209. Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717, 724 (D.R.I.), qffd, 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979).
210. United States v. Patrick, No. CR74-320-5, slip op. at 78 (W.D. Wash. Dec. II, 1974).
211. See text at note 191 supra.
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tance. In analyzing this question, courts should consider both the
interest threatened and the probability that the perceived harm
would occur. The close relation between the defendant and the child
suggests that low levels of pressure may overcome reasonable resistance.212 To assess the probability of the harm occurring, courts
should again consider the information available to the parents, and
distinguish between general evidence and evidence derived from
contact with the child. If the parents rely on the former, courts could
exclude the defense unless strong evidence suggested a threat. The
mere possibility of some injury to the child should not overcome the
resistance of a reasonable person.213 However, if the parent's contact
with the child suggests that the perceived risk is imminent (e.g., the
child appears incapable of independent judgment), the court should
allow the jury to consider whether an ordinary person's resistance
would have been overwhelmed.
Finally, if the court is convinced that the circumstances would
have overcome an ordinary person's resistance, it should consider
whether the defendant's action was excusable. Most parents do not
hurriedly make the decision to deprogram; although their emotional
state may prevent them from correctly assessing the child's situation,
they do attempt to investigate alternatives to forcible abduction. 214
Unless there is evidence that the child's condition would have materially worsened without immediate action, an ordinary person in the
parent's situation would make such an investigation. The investigation - if only consulting a lawyer - should reveal the availability
of conservatorships as an alternative when such proceedings are
available.
Consequently, the defense generally should not avail parents
who did not inquire about or who simply ignored legal alternatives
in a state where a guardianship/conservatorship proceeding is a viable alternative. Because guardianship proceedings .are used only infrequently, hQ_weve~, the failure to pursue this option should not
conclusively decide the issue. If the threat were particularly severe;··
emoti~nally upset parents might believe that intervention is essential
212. It is conceivable that in some cases a court could find lacking the necessary closeness
between parents and an adult child to justify recognition of the compulsion defense. This
might be the case, for example, if the parents and child had been separated for a long period of
time. But as a general matter, it is reasonable to assume that parents will be sufficiently close
to even adult children to justify recognition of the defense. This view is in accord with the
authorities who suggest that harm posed to relatives is sufficient ground for recognition of the
duress defense. See Hersey & Avins, supra note 102, at 286; Newman & Weitzer, supra note
32, at 323; Note, Criminal Law- .Duress-Standardfar .Duress Based Upon Person ofReason-

able Firmness with Burden

of Persuasion by Preponderance of Evidence Upon .Defendant -

State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 775 (1977), 9 SETON HALL L. R.Ev. 556, 561 (1978).
213. Such a view is consistent with the traditional approach, which required a specific
threat, rather than the possibility of some future harm. Even those cases that have urged an
exception to this rule have based it on the high probablity of the future harm occurring.
214. See, e.g., F. CONWAY & J. SPIEGELMAN, supra note 155, at 83.
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and yet be convinced that there is little chance of prevailing in court
because of judicial reluctance to interfere with religion and the limited use of these proceedings in the past.215 Additionally, if the parents obtained legal advice, but were not informed of this option,
their involvement in deprogramming might be excusable.
There are circumstances in which parents, and perhaps close
friends, could successfully assert the compulsion defense, but it usually would not exculpate other parties. Courts could reject other
parties' attempts to assert the defense as a matter of law because the
threat was not to someone close to the deprogrammer. While the
natural bond between parents and children may prevent parents
from making a socially rational decision, professional deprogrammers have no special circumstances that make their decisions so understandable. Instead of reacting like ordinary people,
deprogrammers have distinguished themselves by deciding to take
the law into their own hands.
CONCLUSION

More than sixty years ago, the Supreme Court replaced the rigid
retreat requirement in self-defense cases with a rule providing that
failure to retreat should only be considered as one factor in determining the reasonableness of a defendant's behavior.216 Justice
Holmes observed that such reform was necessary because the original cases developing the defense "had a tendency to ossify into specific rules without much regard for reason."217 The process of
ossification is again apparent in the development of the unitary approach to the necessity defense. The unhappy result of this process is
the gulf that presently exists between the policies underlying necessity and the rules that define the defense. To further these policies
more effectively and coherently, courts should adopt a dualistic
approach.
The inadequacy of the traditional necessity defense is evident in
the deprogramming cases. In these cases, courts should carefully
consider the applicability of the policies justifying the defense. If
deprogramming is clearly necessary to protect a cult member, and if
there is no legal means to meet this necessity, then the choice of evils
defense is applicable. If the pressures on the parents were so great
that their irrational decision is ''understandable," then the compul215. This does not mean that the perceived unwillingness of the courts to act would ordinarily be a reasonable basis for disregarding this option. However, given the diminished capacity of the defendant, a court might find that the defendant's refusal to rely on this
alternative was understandable.
216. See Delgado, Religious Tota/ism as Slavery, 9 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
(1980).
217. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
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sion defense applies. But the rigid, and often unjustified, limitations
that have been placed on the necessity defense have prevented courts
from confronting the important questions that deprogramming cases
raise.
Whether one views deprogramming as a rescue from slavery or
as a gross intrusion on religious liberty, it is rather extraordinary that
such an important decision has largely been left in private hands.
Strong legislative decisions either for or against cults in the foreseeable future, however, are unlikely. 218 This inaction can be attributed
to the clash between legislative reluctance to interfere with religion
and legislative concern with the well-being of cult members, as well
as to sympathy for the position of distraught parents. As long as
legislatures are abdicating some authority to make these decisions to
private individuals, it is essential that courts rationally supervise the
way that this authority is exercised. Such a supervisory role can in
part be performed through the reasonable application of the defenses
of choice of evils and compulsion.

218. See generally N.Y. Times, May 22, 1981, at 10, col. 5 (discussing legislative actions
that have been taken).

